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I. INTRODUCTION

P

ersian Gulf armed conflicts during 1980-88 (the Iran-Iraq conflict) and
1990-91 (the Gulf War between Iraq and the U.N. Coalition after Iraq's
invasion and occupation of Kuwait) have resulted in environmental degradations
of Gulf waters and the land and airspace over States party to the conflicts. Perhaps
the worst of these was what a Time writer called a "Man-Made Hell on Earth"l
when Iraq dynamited over 550 of 684 producing Kuwaiti oil wells in early 1991
during the GulfWar. 2
This paper does not address environmental issues related to land and air
warfare. Rather, the ensuing analysis explores the maritime aspects of these wars,
i.e. the "Tanker War" in the Persian Gulf during 1980-88, and conflict at sea during
the Gulf War of 1990-91, in their environmental contexts.3
In 1983, Iraqi rocket attacks hit Iran's Nowruz offshore drilling facilities,
causing a 20-million barrel oil spill into the Gulf. Although early reports that the
slick had equalled the size of Belgium were later discounted, it was big enough to
threaten Bahraini, Qatari and Saudi desalination plants before strong winds blew
it offshore and partially dispersed it. Fish imports into the United Arab Emirates
(U.A.E.) were stopped becuase of oil contamination in the fishing grounds. Iraq
rejected Iran's request for a partial truce so that oil cappers could try to stop the
2000-5000 barrels per day flow. The result was that the leakage lasted for nine
months.4 This may have been in response to Iran's attack on Iraqi oil terminals
and ports early in the war, which resulted in their closure. There are no reports of
significant pollution of the Gulf resulting from these attacks.5 In 1986, Iraq
bombed Iran's Sirri, Lavan and Larak oil terminals, and Iran attacked the neutral
U.A.E. Abu al-Bakoush oil installations. In none of these cases were there reports
of significant spillage into the Gulf.6 The next year, U.S. naval forces attacked
Iranian offshore oil rigs used as an Iranian gunboat base in response to Iran's
Silkworm missile strike on a reflagged tanker, S.S. Sea Isle City, in Kuwaiti waters.
There is no report of petroleum spillage on the high seas resulting from either
attack?
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Tanker War shipping losses from attacks by both belligerents were another
source of marine pollution during that conflict. Although most tankers traveled
in ballast to the Gulf, they and incoming cargo vessels had bunker fuels aboard.
All outbound ships also had bunkers aboard, and nearly all tankers leaving the
Gulf departed with a full load. These vessels, as well as inbound and outbound
cargo ships, were attacked by the belligerents. Iraq and Iran also laid naval mines,
either initially set adrift or which came loose from their moorings. Several
merchantmen, among them neutral flagged vessels, were mined. A U.S. warship,
U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts, was seriously damaged by an Iranian-laid mine in 1988.
Iraqi aircraft attacked tankers escorted by Iranian warships, and both countries
conducted land-based air attacks on merchant ships, primarily tankers, of neutral
flags, some of which were under convoy by neutral warships. Iran used its surface
navy to attack these vessels as well. The U.N. Security Council twice condemned
these attacks and the result on the environment. In 1987, an Iraqi Mirage I aircraft
mistakenly launched two airborne Exocet missiles at, and seriously damaged, the
U.S. warship, U.S.S. Stark. Another source of marine pollution came from losses
of naval vessels, principally those of Iran, hit as self-defense measures following
attacks on U.S. naval vessels. The conflict was a major war, not a small one,
particularly when the commitments ofIran and Iraq were measured. For the only
time since World War II, deliberate, sustained operations were carried out against
merchant ships.8 Iran and Iraq attacked more than 400 merchantmen, sinking 31
with 50 more declared total losses. Write-off losses stood at nearly half the World
War II tonnage sunk.9 The Second World War lasted for just under six years. The
Iran-Iraq War ground on for eight years. The reason for the disparity between the
relatively small number of ships lost and the huge tonnage losses is, of course, the
larger displacement of merchant vessels in the 1980s. The possible result when a
tanker was attacked during 1980-88 was the risk of a considerably larger oil spill
for each ship attacked than during World War II.
Ten days after the U.N. Security Council-authorized Coalition action to drive
Iraq out of Kuwait began during the Gulf War, 10 Iraq opened valves of its Mina
al-Bakr offshore terminal and occupied-Kuwait's Sea Island terminal. Iraq also
dumped oil from five tankers at Mina al-Bakr. From 3 to 16 million barrels of oil
flowed into the upper Gulf. When the oil reached Arabian peninsula shores,
thousands of migratory birds died in the muck. Fishing grounds were ruined. The
food chain for all forms of Gulf wildlife was interrupted. Beaches were made
unusable for the tourist industry. Saudi desalination plants, which supplied the
civil population and Coalition military forces with drinking water, were
threatened. Coalition air forces stopped the flood by bombing the pumping
stations. 11
There was little destruction of merchant shipping during the 1990-91 Gulf War.
The U.N. embargo and authorizations for interception and diversion ofIraq-bound
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vessels did not result in any attacks. 12 Only a few Coaltion warships were damaged,
mostly by mines, and although Iraqi naval forces were destroyed, they were mostly
small ships. Most vessel-source pollution came from the Mina al-Bakr tankers. 13
As both conflicts make clear, if the belligerents who initiated environmental
degradation had hoped to improve their fortunes on the battlefield by these tactics,
any optimism went a-glimmering. The Iran-Iraq war wore on for five more years
before ending in mid-1988. The Iraqi attack on Nowruz was not a war-stopper,
and leakage from stricken merchantmen did not even receive media attention.
Similarly, blasting oil wells and dumping Kuwaiti crude into the upper Gulf
during the 1990-91 war did not influence events appreciably.14
Although environmental damage and restoration were not as long-lasting as
first predicted, the economic loss was staggering. IS Oil spills and resulting slicks
dwarfed the size of previous accidental spills. Perhaps 24 times as much oil as was
released in the 1989 grounding ofExxon Valdez in Alaska's Prince William Sound,
went into the Gulf because of Iraq's actions in 1991.16 The 1978 allision and
breakup of Amoco Cadiz resulted in a spill a fourth or less of Iraq's deliberate
discharge in 1991. 17 There is no account of how much leaked from damaged or
sunken ships during the Tanker War, but since many merchantmen that were hit
carried petroleum, it may have been considerable. Damaged or sunken warships
undoubtedly leaked bunkers into the Gulf. 1S
The foregoing survey does not include oil going overboard in deballasting or
from land-based sources not connected with armed conflict. Worldwide figures
for this pollution rose from about a million metric tons annually in the 19608 to
nearly 7 million tons in 1973, with over half from land-based sources and 35
percent from ships. Two-thirds of the latter have been said to be from "routine
tanker operations.,,19
Environmental degradation during international armed conflict is not a new
phenomenon. Pollution of the sea on a measurable scale during warfare at sea has
largely been an aspect of Twentieth Century conflicts, particularly after oil
replaced coal as the primary source of energy for steam-powered ships, and the
world began to consume petroleum as the primary fuel for transportation, as a
major source for heating, and an ingredient for plastics and other products. The
Persian Gulf has been a particularly busy highway for transporting petroleum,
since a high percentage of the Earth's proven reserves are within the territories of
States bordering the Gulf. The problem of pollution of the oceans is not ne~o or
confined to the Gulf. However, the recent Gulf wars have merely underscored
issues that have arisen on a worldscale basis, usually in the context of accidents
through collisions or groundings of tankers. These accidents, like the loss of
R.M.S. Titanic in 1912 and the resulting 1914 Convention for Safety of Life at Sea,2l
have tended to be catalysts for treaties or other action to prevent recurrences.22
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The world little noted warnings of the potential for environmental degradation
of the seas before, during and after the Tanker War. 23 However, there were
numerous claims that Iraq had violated existing international norms, notably
those in the Environmental Modification Convention24 and Additional Protocol
125 to the Geneva Conventions of1949,26 which declare principles of humanitarian
law during armed conflict. The U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 687,
declaring Iraq "liable under international law for any direct damage, including
environmental damage and in depletion of natural resources, or ... injury as a
result of [its] unlawful invasion and occupation ofKuwait.,,27 There were also calls
in the United Nations and other quarters for action in the form of additionaUegal
protections, e.g., a Fifth or "Green" Geneva Convention to protect the
environment during armed conflict.28 The latter efforts largely came to naught,
primarily because participants concluded that no new agreements were necessary
if existing ones were enforced. 29 The question of belligerents' culpability for
environmental damage during international armed conflict at sea remains as a
possible source of rhetoric, if not law, in future conflicts. Publication of the San
Remo Manual in 1995 30 demonstrates that the issue remains alive in
commentators' minds, as does this Symposium.
This paper is a partial summary of principal findings of my research on this
complex subject and is limited to the law of the sea, the oceans environment and
how these sometimes overlapping bodies oflaw relate to the law of armed conflict
at sea, i.e. the law of naval warfare. Land-based aspects of environmental issues
(e.g., transborder air pollution), and problems related exclusively to land warfare
or air warfare above the land, are not discussed.
II. The Law of the Maritime Environment, the Law of the Sea, and the
Law of Naval Warfare
There is an enormous volume oflaw related to the maritime environment, most
of it in treaties appearing since the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the
Sea.31 If international agreements related to conservation of marine resources32 or
maritime safety3 are considered, insofar as observing these standards would
promote a better oceans environment, there were scattered efforts at protection of
the oceans well before 1958. The same is true with respect to the law of naval
warfare, where treaties negotiated to regulate aspects of warfare or humanitarian
principles to be observed during war derivatively benefit the environment,
particularly when conflict at sea has impact ashore. Agreements of this nature
include the 1907 Hague Conventions dealing with shore bombardment and mine
warfare34; the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, whose prohibitions on gas and
bacteriological warfare affect human and nonhuman inhabitants of the
environment35; the 1935 Roerich Pact36 protecting monuments, etc., ashore; parts
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions37; and the 1954 Hague Cultural Property
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Convention,38 which provides inter alia for safe sealift of protected objects. There
is thus as deep a legacy of what today are called environmental concerns in the law
of armed conflict as those agreements dealing with pollution or species protection,
which today might be lumped under the same rubric.
The 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea39 is the first worldwide
multilateral agreement attempting to deal comprehensively with maritime
environmental problems. For those countries that are or become parties,40 the
Convention will replace the 1958 LOS Conventions.41 Bahrain 'lind Iraq ratified
it in 1985, and Kuwait in 1986; many other countries, e.g. France and the U.A.E.,
were signatories, but other States with prominent roles in the Gulf wars- e.g., the
United Kingdom and the United States-were not signatories or parties during
the Tanker War or the 1990-91 conflict.42 Thus, for some States there was an
obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the Convention during part of
these confrontations,43 and others were bound by the custom the Convention
restated.44
The Convention has different provisions dealing with the welter of custom and
treaties affecting the maritime environment; it continues 1958 convention
provisions stating the relationship between the law of the sea and the law of armed
conflict and its component, the law of naval warfare.4S
A. The Relationship Between the 1982 LOS Convention and Other
Environmental Treaties
The 1982 LOS Convention will be an effective ifmild trumping device-much
as the U.N. Charter, Article 103, declares that Charter norms supersede those of
all other treaties46-for agreements related to maritime environmental protection,
whether already in force or to come into force, which may have special terms but
which "should be carried out in a manner consistent with the general principles
and objectives of [the] Convention.,,47 This is slightly different from Article
311(2), the general supersession provision for the Convention, which declares that
it does not alter existing rights "which arise from other agreements compatible
with this Convention" and which do not affect enjoyment of other parties' rights
or performance of their obligations.48 The upshot is that all agreements in place
or to be negotiated, if related to the generally-stated environmental norms of the
Convention, must conform to these Convention norms.49
Reading of Part XII of the 1982 LOS Convention,SO as well as many references
to environmental standards scattered elsewhere throughout the document,Sl
demonstrates that specifics are more often found in other agreements, perhaps
bilateral, and frequently regional in recent years. The latter have been often
sponsored by the U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP), which developed after
52
the Stockholm 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment. Examples
of these include two that are particularly relevant to this analysis, the 1978 Kuwait
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Regional Convention and ProtocolS3 and the 1982 Red Sea Convention and
Protoco1.S4 Although the Persian Gulf was the principal theater of maritime
military operations during the 1990-91 Gulf war, there were many Coalition
interceptions of Iraq-bound merchantmen in the Red Sea, and some missile and
air strikes were launched from there. S5 In many instances, detailed regulations are
developed by administrative bodies established by the treaties.56 This procedure
is contemplated in the 1982 LOS Convention.57
There is the possibility, of course, that a parallel but contradictory custom58 or
other source of law may develop alongside Convention-based norms. 59 The
developing customary norm might be the same as, and thereby strengthen, the
Convention norm. 60 If in opposition, the custom will weaken the treaty norm. 61
However, no treaty, and probably no custom, can supersede the U.N. Charter,
mandatory norms developed under it,62 orjus cogens norms. 63
B. "Other Rules" Clauses in the Conventions
Both the 1958 and 1982 LOS Conventions include clauses, sometimes
overlooked in analysis or commentary, stating that rights under these agreements
are subject to "other rules of international law" as well as terms in the particular
convention. 64 For example, Article 87(1) of the 1982 LOS Convention, which
declares high seas freedoms, also says that "Freedom of the high seas is exercised
under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of
internationallaw.,,6S Four conclusions can be stated.
First, the overwhelming majority of commentators-including the
International Law Commission, a U.N. General Assembly agency ofinternational
law experts66-have stated that the "other rules" clauses in the 1958 and 1982 LOS
Conventions refer to the law of armed conflict,67 a component of which is the law
of naval warfare. Therefore, provisions such as Article 88 of the 1982 LOS
Convention state a truism-i.e. that the high seas are reserved for peaceful
purposes68-but high seas usage can be subject to the law of naval warfare, when
Article 87(1)'s other rules clause is read with Article 88. As in the case of the 1958
conventions,
That provision does not preclude ... use of the high seas by naval forces. Their use
for aggressive purposes, which would ... violat[e] ... Article 2(4) of the [U.N.]
Charter ... , is forbidden as well by Article 88 [ofthe Convention]. See also LOS
Convention, Article 301, requiring parties, in exercising their rights and
p[er]forming their duties under the Convention, to refrain from any threat or use of
force in violation of the Charter.69
This analysis is buttressed by the Charter's trumping clause; no treaty can
supersede the Charter.1° Thus, the peaceful purposes language in Article 88 and
other provisions of the Convention71 cannot override Charter norms, such as those
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in Article 2(4), but also those in Article 51, i.e. the "inherent right of individual
and collective self-defense."n
Second, there is no indication that the LOS Convention drafters thought that
the other rules clauses refer to anything else, and particularly to any customary
law of the environment. International environmental law was a mere gleam in
academics' and futurists' eyes when the 1958 LOS Conventions were signed, with
only a patchwork of international agreements on the subject,13 and there is no
indication that the International Law Commission considered the issue. By
contrast, there was an established body of law dealing with armed conflict
situations, including naval warfare, at the time.
Third, other agreements dealing with protection of the maritime environment
include clauses exempting, or partially exempting, their application during armed
conflict or similar situations. Some speak of war,74 others armed conflict or the
need to protect vital national interests?5 This includes the recently-ratified North
American Free Trade Agreement?6 This tends to confirm the view of applying
the law of armed conflict as a separate body of law in appropriate situations. To
the extent that treaties dealing with the maritime environment do not have such
clauses,77 such agreements must beread in the light ofthe LOS conventions, which
include such provisions. And to the extent that the 1958 LOS conventions today
recite customary norms-and such is the case with the High Seas
Convention78-applying the laws of armed conflict (LOAC) as a separate body of
law in appropriate situations as a customary norm must also be considered with
LOAC treaties and other sources79 when analyzing environmental issues in this
context.
Fourth, principles of the law of treaties-e.g., impossibility of performance,80
fundamental change of circumstances,81 or war, the last applying only to parties
to a conflict82-may suspend operation of international agreements during a
conflict or other emergency situation, or may terminate them. The outbreak of
hostilities obviously does not suspend or terminate humanitarian conventions
designed to apply in armed conflict.83 The other side of the coin is the policy of
pacta sunt servanda, i.e., treaties should be observed,84 and one manifestation of this
principle is that States signing treaties should not behave so as to defeat their object
and purpose. 85 The often-amorphous law of treaty succession86 must be
considered, particularly with respect to older agreements, including those stating
the law of armed conflict, to the extent that such treaties are not part of customary
law today.87 Ifthese agreements restate custom, and are subject to treaty succession
principles with respect to a particular country, that country is doubly bound.88
The conclusion is inescapable that the other rules clauses of the 1958
Conventions-provisions that were carried forward into the 1982 LOS
Convention-mean that the terms of the Conventions are subject to the law of
armed conflict, of which the law of naval warfare is a part. Since the 1958 High
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Seas Convention is generally regarded as a restatement of customary law, its other
rules clauses 3:re part of the customary norms governing oceans law during armed
conflict.
C. The 1982 LOS Convention and the Maritime Environment
Although the Convention is prolix on the subject of the environment, the
changes it proposes are neither great nor radical; it takes a holistic approach. 89
The core of marine environmental standards are in Part XII, which establishes for
the first time a comprehensive legal framework for protecting and preserving the
marine environment.90 Other Convention provisions deal with environmental
issues91 in the context of specific ocean areas.

1. Part XII of the Convention
Part XII begins by declaring that "States have the obligation to protect and
preserve the marine environment.,,92 The Convention does not define "marine
environment," but the negotiators generally understood that the atmosphere is
included where relevant. 93 It also includes living resources, marine ecosystems
and sea water quality.94 The Convention defmes "pollution of the marine
environment"; it
... means the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy
into the marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result
in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to
human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and the legitimate
uses ofthe sea, impairment ofquality for use ofsea water and reduction ofamenities.95

The Convention also declares that States' "sovereign right to exploit their
natural resources" pursuant to national environmental policies in, e.g., the EEZ,
is subject to a "duty to preserve and protect the marine environment,,96 against
significant97 damage.
States must act individually and jointly to prevent, reduce and control pollution
of the marine environment from any source, using best practicable means at their
disposal, in accordance with their capabilities. They must harmonize national
policies, i.e., national laws, with this requirement.98 In doing so, they must ensure
that they do not damage other States or their environment by pollution, or that
pollution does not spread beyond their areas of sovereignty or control,99 e.g" the
EEZ, as well as the territorial sea. IOO Required measures include those designed
to minimize to the greatest possible extent releasing toxic, harmful or noxious
substances, especially those that are persistent, from land-based sources, from or
through the atmosphere or by dumping lOI ; pollution from vessels, including
accident prevention measures, dealing with emergencies, safety at sea, preventing
discharges, and regulating design, construction, equipping, operating and
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manning vessels; pollution from installations for exploring or exploiting natural
resources of the seabed and subsoil; pollution from other installations operating
in the marine environment. 102 In so acting, States must refrain from unjustifiable
interference with other States' exercising their Convention rights and duties. 103
Measures taken must include those necessary to protect and preserve rare or fragile
ecosystems and habitats of depleted, threatened or endangered species and other
marine life. 104 In combatting pollution, States must not act to transfer damage or
hazards from one area to another, or to transfer one type of pollution into
another. lOS Technologies that alter or harm the environment, or introduce new or
alien species that would significantly harm the environment must be avoided. 106
There are two distinct duties: avoiding use of harmful technologies, and
"maintain[ing] the natural state of the marine environment," the latter an
innovation in internationallaw. 107
The Convention requires enviro~mental cooperation on global and regional
bases. lOS Other provisions require cooperation in scientific research and in
establishing scientific criteria for rules for pollution prevention, reduction and
controI. 109 States must also monitor, publish and assess the marine environment
and provide scientific and technical assistance, with preference for developing
States,uo A State must notify other countries and competent international
organizations (e.g., the International Maritime Organization, IMO) of actual or
imminent pollution damage to the environment. lll Notification is a rule of
customary international law. 112 Notice "also envisages that a notified State may
wish to take preventive action to avert damage to itse1f."U3 States must jointly
develop and promote contingency plans to combat pollution, cooperating with
international organizations within limits of their capabilities. 114
The Convention establishes standards for international rules and national laws
to combat pollution. US States must adopt measures at least as effective as
international rules and standards to prevent, reduce and control pollution from
land-based sources; seabed activities, artificial islands and installations subject to
"national jurisdiction;" the Area; and vessels of their registry or flag. U6 The
phrase "national jurisdiction" includes internal waters, the territorial sea, the
EEZ, the continental shelf and archipelagic waters. U7
Similar principles govern ocean dumping. us Dumping in another State's
territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf waters requires the coastal State's express
prior approval; it may regulate such dumping after consulting with other affected
countries,u9
Although some drafters thought that emergency fuel discharge from aircraft
might not be an exception to prohibitions on ocean dumping without prior express
approval, eventually the conclusion was that general international law allows such
onforce majeure or distress theories as an exception to treaty compliance. 120 What
is true for aircraft is also true for ships; distress and force majeure theories are
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recognized for innocent passage and straits transit passage regimes. Distress and

force majeure can be valid claims during armed conflict situations, with different
rules applying in relationships among States not party to a conflict, relationships
between belligerents and States not party to a conflict, and relationships between
belligerents. 121
States must harmonize national policies at regionallevels l22 and must work at
the global level to establish rules, standards and recommended practices and
procedures. 123

2. Controlling Pollution and Protecting the Environment in Specific Ocean Areas
The 1982 Convention, Part XII, also recites standards related to specific ocean
areas, e.g., the territorial sea. In some cases, e.g. the contiguous zone, there is no
reference in Part XII.
The Convention has special rules for controlling pollution from vessels in the
territorial sea. States may publish special rules for foreign-flag ships' entry into
port or internal waters, after due notice. These can be cooperative arrangements.
States may adopt special rules for foreign-flag vessels within their territorial sea,
including ships in innocent passage. However, no special rule can hamper
innocent passage. 124
These provisions are consistent with the Convention's navigational articles,
which declare that passage is considered prejudicial to the coastal State's peace,
good order or security if a foreign-flag ship "engages in ... any act of wilful and
serious pollution contrary to [the] Convention[,]" and which allows the coastal
State to adopt regulations, "in conformity with ... this Convention and other rules
of international law, relating to innocent passage ... in respect of •.. conservation
of the living resources of the sea [and] ... preservation of the environment of the
coastal State and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution thereof .•."
with due notice of such rules. Foreign ships must comply with these rules. 125
Tankers, nuclear-powered ships and vessels carrying nuclear or other inherently
dangerous or noxious substances or materials may be required to confine their
passage to sea lanes established by the littoral State. These ships must also observe
any special precautions stated in international agreements. 126 As in other
circumstances, coastal States cannot hamper innocent passage except pursuant to
the Convention. In applying regulations adopted in accordance with it, the
practical effect cannot be to deny or impair innocent passage. There can be no
discrimination in form or fact against any State's ships or against vessels carrying
cargo to, from or for any State. 127
However, coastal States may act to prevent breach ofconditions attached to port
calls or passage to internal waters. Moreover, they may temporarily suspend
innocent passage in specific areas of their territorial sea if essential for protecting
their security after duly published notice of a suspension. 128 While this might
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arguably allow suspension for "environmental security" reasons, such is not the
case. Repetition from the Territorial Sea Convention,129 and the 1982
Convention's drafting history,B° point to a different view. The right of temporary
suspension balances between a coastal State's right to protect its territorial
integrity through legitimate self-defense measures 131 and rights ofnavigation, etc.,
under the territorial sea innocent passage regime. How protecting a coastal State's
environment fits into the analysis is a different issue.
The same territorial sea rules for criminal and civil jurisdiction, and for
immunity of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial
purposes, also apply to environment-related claims. For example, warships that
do not comply with valid coastal State environmental regulations can only be
required to leave the territorial sea immediately. Flag States are responsible under
international law for loss or damage caused by their warships or other
noncommercial vessels. 132 The Convention's innocent passage rules, insofar as
they concern environmental protection, are also subject to "other rules of
international law," i.e., the law of naval warfare. 133
The Convention's innocent passage rules apply to straits for which innocent
passage rights obtain and to archipelagic waters passage. 134 If a country qualifying
as an archipelagic State declares archipelagic sea lanes and air routes and they are
adopted by the appropriate international organization (i.e. IMO),135 duties ofships
and aircraft regarding the oceans environment, authorization for the archipelagic
State to adopt laws, and the requirement that the right of passage shall not be
hampered or suspended applicable to straits transit passage, attach to archipelagic
sea lanes passage. A difference between straits innocent passage and archipelagic
innocent passage, whether lanes have been declared or not, is that archipelagic
States may suspend innocent passage for security reasons as under the territorial
sea regime, while straits innocent passage is nonsuspendable. 136 Although coastal
States may take appropriate enforcement measures against vessels "causing or
threatening major damage" to the straits environment because they have violated
navigational safety, maritime traffic or environmental laws while in transit passage
(the regime for most straits), this does not apply to warships or other vessels
entitled to sovereign immunity.137
Article 33 of the Convention, permitting a contiguous zone, does not
specifically mention environmental protection. It allows declaration of such a
zone, which, if no EEZ has been claimed, is a high seas area contiguous to the
territorial sea but no wider than 24 miles from territorial sea baselines. The coastal
State may exercise control in the zone to prevent infringement of its customs,
fiscal, immigration or sanitary (i.e., health or quarantine) laws and to punish
violations committed within the territorial sea.138 It is conceivable that
environmental protection claims could be made with respect to health law
enforcement, but this has not been the traditional view of the zone's purpose.139

196

Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict

Article 33 is tied to Article 303 of the Convention, which sets standards for
archeological and historical objects found at sea. 140 "Found at sea" seems to have
a more comprehensive scope than "found in the marine environment." Another
problem with Article 303 is that there is no agreed definition of the terms
"archaeological" and "historical.,,141 Article 303 says that its terms are also
"without prejudice to other international agreements and rules of international
law regarding the protection of objects of an archaeological and historical
nature,,,142 a variant on the "other rules" clauses that make the Convention subject
to the law of armed conflict in appropriate situations. 143 In internal waters, the
territorial sea and archipelagic waters, coastal State law governs as to artifacts
found there; beyond, out to the Area, i.e., the deep seabed beyond national
jurisdiction or sovereignty, Article 303 controls but does not accord sovereign
rights. 144 Objects found in the Area must be preserved or disposed offor the benefit
of humankind, with "particular regard" for the State of origin,14S if that can be
determined.
Consistent with the Convention's navigational articles,l46 as in the case of the
territorial sea, coastal States may adopt special laws for their EEZs. 147 Although
there is no explicit cross-reference to Convention continental shelf principles in
this Part XII provision, clearly the coastal State has the same kind of
environmental rights and responsibilities with regard to activities on its
continental shelf where shelf sovereignty has been declared with no claim for an
EEZ.148 For both the EEZ and the continental shelf, coastal States must have due
regard for other oceans users' high seas rights, including navigation and
overflight. 149 Both are subjectto sovereign immunity exceptions for, e.g., warships,
and the "other rules of international law" principle, in connection with coastal
State environmental regulation. 1SO
Provisions allowing coastal State regulation of pollution from vessels in the
territorial sea, the EEZ and above the continental shelf are considered an
"innovation for the general law of the sea," which usually has looked to flag or
registry States to control pollution from ships. lSI Whether considered lex lata or
de lege ferenda today, these innovative provisions are subject to qualifications: there
must be a balance of due regard for others' high seas rights, e.g., freedoms of
navigation or overflight; warships and other non-commercial vessels retain
sovereign immunity; and any attempt at environmental regulation of these sea
areas is subject to law of armed conflict principles in appropriate situations
through the "other rules" clauses.
The 1982 Convention also provides for enforcing environmental standards.
States must adopt laws implementing international norms for land-based
pollution, pollution from seabed activities, ocean dumping, and through or from
the atmosphere.1S 2 The pollution hazard must be significant. 1S3
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States in whose port a vessel, suspected of polluting that State's internal or
territorial waters or EEZ, in violation of international standards, is located, may
investigate, detain or begin enforcement against that ship. These rights are subject
to, e.g., notice to the flag or registry State, nondiscriminatory enforcement, and
enforcement only through State vessels, e.g., warships or vessels on authorized
government service. 154 Enforcing States may not endanger safety of navigation or
create a hazard to an accused vessel, bring it to an unsafe port or anchorage, or
expose the marine environment to "an unreasonable risk.,,155 A detaining State is
liable for unlawful enforcement measures, excessive "in the light of available
information" at the time. 156 The Convention also provides in Article 221 that
1. Nothing ... prejudice[s] the right of States, pursuant to international law, both
customary and conventional, to take and enforce measures beyond the territorial sea
proportionate to the actual or threatened damage to protect their coastline or related
interests, including fishing, from pollution or threat of pollution following upon a
maritime casualty or acts relating to such a casualty, which may reasonably be
expected to result in major harmful consequences.

2.... "[M]aritime casualty" means a collision of vessels, stranding or other incident
of navigation, or other occurrence on board a vessel or external to it resulting in
material damage or imminent threat of material damage to a vessel or cargo.
Measures to be taken under Art. 221(1) include destruction of the vessel. These
provisions, found in other widely-accepted pollution prevention conventions,157
may be close to acceptance as customary international law, if such is not already
the case. ISS Such a right of intervention would have justified Persian Gulf
countries' acting to prevent oil pollution damage from the attacks on oil terminal
facilities or vessels during the Tanker War,159 assuming there was a threat within
the Convention definition, and that the leakage resulting from the attacks was a
"casualty" within the meaning of Article 221(2), i.e., an "occurrence on board a
vessel or external to it resulting in, or imminent threat, of material damage to a
vessel or cargo." The provisions may not have applied to Iran and Iraq in that war
because of the "other rules" clauses of the LOS Conventions, applicable at least as
customary law,160 but as between Persian Gulf States not party to the conflict and
either belligerent, or as between States not party to the war, the law of the sea
applied in this context. Since U.N. Security Council resolutions at least
theoretically involved all countries around the Gulf during the 1990-91 conflict,
LOS principles allowing intervention may have gone by the boards because of the
other rules clauses as to the Iraq-initiated spill from the Kuwaiti port. 161 To the
extent that Article 221 would apply as a customary norm, it supplied additional
justification for Coalition attacks to stop the discharge.
In the context of the Convention's enforcement provisions, here too warships,
naval auxiliaries and other vessels or aircraft on government non-commercial
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service may not be detained and have sovereign immunity; this is qualified by
requiring flag States to ensure, by adopting "appropriate measures" not impairing
operations or operational capabilities of such ships or aircraft, that they operate
consistently, so far as is reasonable and practicable, with the Convention. This
policy repeats other Convention immunity rules except for the "appropriate
measures" qualification. 162 It
... acknowledges that military vessels and aircraft are unique platforms not always
adaptable to conventional environmental technologies and equipment because of
weight and space limitations, harsh operating conditions, the requirements of
long-term sustainability, or other security considerations.... [S]ecurity needs may
limit compliance with disclosure requirements. 163
Some regional environmental protection agreements either omit164 a
declaration of the customary immunity rule or do not append the 1982 LOS
Convention's limitations and requirements for appropriate measures. The Kuwait
Regional Convention and the Red Sea Convention are examples of the latter. 165
To the extent that the Convention binds treaty partners in a given context, those
treaties must be considered modified to that extent. 166 To the extent that the LOS
Convention restates customary law, the longstanding principle of warship and
naval auxiliary immunity167 is a powerful factor for its application in these
contexts as well.
Other divisions of the 1982 LOS Convention providing for environmental
protection independently of Part XII include those dealing with vessel accidents
on the high seas, high seas fishing, and the Area, also a part of the high seas, and
marine scientific research. The Convention's high seas fishing provisions follow
in part those of the 1958 conventions, but rules for the Area are unique to the 1982
Convention. Because there has been little technology capable of exploiting that
part of the ocean, and because the Convention has only recently come into force,
these provisions are presently largely theoretical in nature. Nevertheless, they are
likely to have impact in the next century, and many restate concepts in other ocean
areas regulated by the Convention.
The Convention requires more of flag States as to ships under their registry and
operating on the high seas. Flag States must ensure "that the master, officers and,
to the extent appropriate, the crew are fully conversant with and required to
observe the applicable international regulations concerning ••. prevention,
reduction and control of marine pollution....,,168 The Convention also requires
States to "cause an inquiry to be held ... into every marine casualty or incident of
navigation on the high seas involving a ship flying its flag and causing [inter
alia] ... serious damage ... to the marine environment. The flag State and the
other State shall co-operate in the conduct of any inquiry ... into any such marine
casualty or incident of navigation.,,169
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There is a duty among States bordering semi-enclosed areas, i.e., a gulf or other
body surrounded by two or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean
by a narrow outlet, such as the Persian Gulf, to coordinate managing, conserving,
exploring and exploiting oceanic living resources, and to coordinate implementing
their rights and duties as to protecting and preserving the marine environment. 170
Marine scientific research is recognized as a high seas right in the 1982
Convention,l71 but such operations must be conducted in compliance with
relevant regulations adopted in conformity with the Convention including those
protecting and preserving the marine environment. In
Although high seas fisherfolk retain the traditional freedom to seek their
catch,173 the Convention seines in that right to a certain extent, as it has been
under earlier treaties and practice. It "has never been an unfettered right.,,174 The
Convention explicitly subjects high seas fishing rights to limiting treaties, and to
cooperation in achieving agreements, as well as rules it sets for certain fish stocks
and on conserving high seas living resources. 17S To the extent that these treaties
impose environmental controls, the high seas freedom to fish is curtailed. The
same is true for conservation measures imposed by coastal States or agreements.
Although the Convention imposes a due regard formula on concurrent exercise
of high seas freedoms such as navigation, overflight and fishing,176 this formula
does not apply to environmental concerns. l77 The only indirect exception is the
due regard requirement for Area activities,178 which might include environmental
controls.
The Area-defined as the seabed, ocean floor and subsoil beyond national
jurisdictional limits 179-and its resources are declared the common heritage of
humankind. 180 National jurisdiction means, inter alia, a declared EEZ or
continental shelf. The legal status of the water column or airspace above the Area
is not affected by Convention provisions dealing with it. 181 Area governance is
vested in an Authority,182 which must adopt rules and procedures for preventing,
reducing and controlling pollution and other hazards to the marine environment,
including coastlines, interfering with the ecological balance of that environment,
with particular attention being paid to protection from harmful effects of activities
such as drilling, dredging, excavation, waste disposal, building and operating or
maintaining installations, pipelines and other devices. These rules must also
protect and conserve Area natural resources and prevent damage to flora and fauna
of the marine environment. The Authority must take necessary measures, which
may supplement existing treaties, to protect human life, in connection with Area
operations. 183 There is also an obligation to preserve objects of an archaeological
and historical nature found in the Area, with particular regard paid to preferential
rights of a State or country of origin, and which incorporates by reference other
rules oflaw and agreements dealing with artifacts protection. 184 The Convention
also requires that Area activities be undertaken" with reasonable regard for other
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activities in the marine environment." Area installations, like those in the EEZ
and on the continental shelf, inter alia must not be established "where interference
may be caused to the use of recognized sea lanes essential to international
navigation or in areas ofintense fishing activity.... Other activities in the marine
environment shall be conducted with reasonable regard for activities in the
Area.,,185
Convention provisions for the Area include an "other rules of international
law" clause:
The general conduct of States in relation to the Area shall be in accordance with the
provisions of this Part [XI], the principles embodied in the [U.N.] Charter ... and
other rules ofinternationallaw in the interests of maintaining peace and security and
promoting international co-operation and mutual understanding. 186

As in the case of the high seas generally, the Convention declares that the Area
shall only be used for peaceful purposes.1 87 The same interpretations should obtain
for application of these articles as analyzed under other parts of the 1982
Convention and its 1958 antecedents. 188 "Other rules" means the law of armed
conflict may be applied in certain contexts. The "peaceful purposes" provision
means that no State can take any action, e.g., aggression, in violation of the Charter.
Peaceful activities under Area rules include military activities, e.g., naval task force
operations. 189

3. RegionalAgreements, the 1982 LOS Convention, and the Law ofArmed Conflict at
Sea
The Kuwait Regional Convention, to which all Persian Gulf countries are party,
including Iran and Iraq, covers the entire Gulf, except for bordering States'
internal waters. Similarly, the Red Sea Convention's geographic sweep includes
that body and the Gulf of Aden, again excepting bordering States' internal
waters. 190 Both define "marine pollution" in nearly identical terms as
introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine
environment resulting or likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living
resources, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities including fishing,
impairment of [the] quality of use for use of [the] sea and reduction of amenities[.]191

Parties pledge cooperation to prevent, abate and combat pollution of the marine
environment in the Gulf or the Red Sea, whether caused by ships, dumping from
ships or aircraft, from exploring and exploiting the territorial sea and its subsoil
and the continental shelf, or land reclamation activities. 192 The Conventions'
Protocols amplify this pledge. 193 The latter include broad definitions of "marine
emergency" to trigger application; it means
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... any casualty, incident, occurrence or situation, however caused, resulting in
substantial pollution or imminent threat of substantial pollution to the marine
environment by oil or other harmful substances and includes, inter alia, collisions,
strandings and other incidents involving ships, including tankers, blow-outs arising
from petroleum drilling and production activities, and the presence of oil or other
harmful substances arising from the failure of industrial installations[.]194
These Conventions and Protocols do not explicitly provide for anticipatory
self-defense against imminent pollution threats, as does the 1982 LOS
Convention. 195 However, the Protocols appear to contemplate such by allowing
"every appropriate measure to combat pollution and/or to rectify the situation,"
provided that other countries are notified l96 of emergency responses, defined as
"any activity intended to prevent, mitigate or eliminate pollution by oil or other
harmful substances or threat of such pollution resulting from marine
emergencies.,,197 This broad grant of authority must be tempered by the
limitations of proportionality, etc., stated in the 1982 Convention. 198 This
Convention language further justifies, subject to notice and proportionality
principles, the concept of anticipatory reaction to imminent threat. And if this be
so, might such be further support for the concept of anticipatory self-defense?199
These regional treaties had applications during the Tanker War and the 1990-91
conflict. The Red Sea Convention and Protocol did not apply to the 1980-88 war,
except as being supportive of common principles in the Kuwait Convention and
Protocol, which did apply, geographically,200 to the Persian Gulf.
There were two belligerents in the Tanker War, Iran and Iraq. The Kuwait
Convention and its Protocol could not have applied per se as between them, either
because of application of the other rules principles of the law of the sea,201 or
because of law of treaties principles such as impossibility of performance,
fundamental change ofcircumstances or armed conflict between them, all ofwhich
are grounds for suspending international agreements.202 However, except insofar
as the latter grounds would apply as between belligerents and other Gulf States
party to the Convention and its Protocol, their pledges to prevent, abate and
combat pollution203 of the marine environment remained in force. To the extent
that the agreements' terms restated customary norms,2°4 these too remained in
force.
Given the completion of the LOS Convention, its clauses paramount and its
terms, virtually identical with those of the Kuwait Convention and its Protocol,
together with terms of other treaties around the world that were virtually identical
with the Convention and the Protocol by 1982, there was at least a developing
customary norm, and perhaps a customary rule, alongside treaty principles stated
in the Kuwait Convention and its Protocol, by 1982.205 If this is so, the belligerents
were obliged not to act so as to pollute, or act to cause an imminent threat, to other
Gulf States' interests, and to interests of other countries using Gulf waters for
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freedom of navigation through actions such as attacks on the Nowruz and other
terminal facilities 206 when the result at the time of decision was likely to be a
207
substantial spill. Under the Kuwait Convention, Iran was arguably within its
rights to ask for an opportunity to stop the outflow.208 For the same reasons, there
may have been violations of the Convention and the Protocol with respect to
spillage resulting from Iraqi and Iranian attacks on shipping during the war,209 if
such could have been foreseen to have resulted in substantial risk to other States'
environmental interests, and such risks occurred. The record is less than clear on
this point.2lO
With respect to the 1990-91 conflict, the analysis is different. First, Iraq could
claim suspension of the Convention and its Protocol under the law oftreaties.211
Second, it could be argued that U.N. Security Council resolutions superseded the
Convention and its Protocol because of the supremacy of Charter-based law in
actions on the environment and in authorizing all necessary means to eject Iraq
from Kuwait. 212 To the extent that customary law was embodied in these treaties
and such customary law survived in the face of Council action under the
Charter,213 Iraq clearly violated these norms in its deliberate spillage of oil into
the Gulf to foil a projected Coalition amphibious attack. 214
Since Coalition naval operations extended into the Red Sea as well as the Persian
Gulf,2IS there was the potential of application of the Red Sea Convention and its
Protocol as to treaty parties such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan.216 If the two
Conventions and Protocols, together with the 1982 LOS Convention, could be said
to state customary norms that survived Council action under the Charter, there
was a potential for violation by Coalition naval forces. The record is void as to both
Red Sea and Gulf operations, and it is highly likely that there were no violations
of customary norms by the Coalition in either theater.

4. The Convention and the Law ofthe Maritime Environment
This summary of Convention terms for protecting the marine environment
demonstrates that Part XII and those terms included in other parts of the treaty
are indeed prolix and comprehensive and there is little that is new law or
unanticipated. Indeed, provisions related to the environment in many cases repeat
principles seen in other contexts: the concept of "due regard" where there are two
or more oceans uses at stake2I7; confirmation of the sovereign immunity of
warships, naval auxiliaries and other government vessels on non-commercial
service and State aircraft2I8; confirmation of application of the law of armed
conflict in the context of environmental protection through application of other
rules clauses, which do not include customary law of the environment as part of
"other rules,,219; the same usage of "peaceful purposes" language in connection
with the Area as on the high seas generally.220 Approval of the use of anticipatory
self-defense against an environmental threat, previously stated in earlier treaties,
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is some precedent for the concept of anticipatory self-defense in the context of the
inherent right to self-defense mentioned in the Charter.221
Other Persian Gulf States could possibly have asserted claims during the
Tanker War if the belligerents' attacks on Gulf shipping caused slicks that
threatened their interests, or if the attacks on the oil terminals, including that on
Nowruz in 1983, raised the same threat. 222 A similar analysis obtains for the
Kuwait Convention and its Protocol.223
Whether the deliberate flood by Iraq during the 1990-91 conflict could have
been a predicate for similar claims depends on whether the law of the sea was
superseded by the law of the Charter, and particularly the effect of U.N. Security
Council decisions. 224 A similar analysis would obtain under the regional
conventions.225 Although there was the potential for applying the same law to
Coalition operations, there is no indication that there were violations by Coalition
naval forces. 226
Apparently these issues were not advanced in either war, but as the Convention
is accepted by more States, either as treaty law or as customary norms, these claims
may be raised in the future, particularly if the Convention is buttressed by similar
terms in regional and bilateral agreements, although the Convention's norms
trump any to the contrary in these treaties.227
This cursory review of a complex body oflaw raises the double question of the
relationship between the law of the maritime environment and the general law of
the sea, perhaps under a "due regard" analysis, and the relationship between the
law of the environment and the law of armed conflict, perhaps also on a "due
regard" basis. This is complicated by the Convention's placement of some
environmental norms within Part XII, the general standards, and its sprinkling
others throughout the treaty.228 How do these bodies of law-the law of the
maritime environment, the general law of the sea, and the law of armed
conflict-interrelate? The Convention gives no clear answer on this issue.
III. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
If the 1982 LOS Convention is a "constitution" for the law of the sea where the
law of armed conflict is not involved, its provisions for protecting the marine
environment could be said to be a seagoing "bill of rights" for the environment.
Treaties varying from Convention environmental protection provisions are
subject to the Convention's terms for those States that are party to it. 229 Custom
may compete with the Convention in the future, andjus cogens and U.N. Charter
norms may supersede part of it as well.230
Customary norms, first codified in the 1958 LOS Conventions, confirming
sovereign immunity for warships, naval auxiliaries and other vessels on
government non-commercial service and State aircraft, are affirmed in the 1982
Convention and have been repeated in regional agreements. 231 Similarly,
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recognition of the law of armed conflict and its component, the law of naval
warfare, as applicable in certain situations, is confirmed in the Convention's
navigational articles and its environmental provisions.232 The principle of "due
regard" for competing oceans uses, particularly on the high seas, has been carried
forward into the 1982 Convention.233
What is new is a complex, prolix protection for the maritime environment. The
fundamental issue has become the relationship of this relatively new body of law
with the general law of the sea and the law of armed conflict.
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Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Noninternational Armed Conflicts, Concluded at Geneva on June 10, 1977, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-2, looth Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 561 (1987). Many Additional Protocol I signatories ftled declarations or
reservations.
26. Convention for Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12,
1949,6 U.S.T. 3114; 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for Amelioration of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, id. 3217; 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Convention
Relative to Treatment ofPrisoners ofWar, Aug. 12, 1949,id. 3316; 75 U.N.T.S.135; Convention Relative to Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12; 1949, id. 3516; 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Convention],
provisions of which bear, directly or indirectly, on environmental issues during armed conflicL
27. U.N. S.c. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M.846 (1991); U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 47/37 (1992) also declared that existing international law prohibits environmental damage and depletion
of narural resources, e.g. destruction of oil wells and releasing oil into the sea as occurred during the 1990.91 war.
28. See generally BIRNIE & BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TIlE ENVIRONMENT (1994) at 128; Diederich, "Law of
War" and Ecology - A Proposal for a Workable Approach to Protecting the Environment Through the Law of War, 136 Mil.
L. Rev. 137, 160 (1992); Lijnzaad & Tanja, supra n. 2, at 189-200; Morris, Protection oftheEnvironmentin Wartime: The
United Nations GeneralAssembly Considers the Needfora New CotrlJC1Ition, 27 Int'I Law. 775 (1993); Sharp, supra n. 2, at
3; Plant, Elements of a "Fifth Geneva" Convention on the Protection of the Environment in Time of Armed Conflict, in
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra n. 2, at 37; Plant, G(1)emmen/ Proposals andFutureProspects, in id. 170; Plant,Legal
Aspects, supra n. II, at 229-31; Plant,Responses to the London Conference and the Ottawa Conference ofExperts on the Use
of the Environment as a Tool ofCorroentional Warfare, 1()"12]uly 1991, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEcnON, supra at 161;
Terry, The Environment and the Laws of War: The Impact ofDesert Storm, 45 Nav. War C. Rev. 60, 65 (1992).
29. U.N.G.A. Res. 47/37, supra n. 27; Morris, supra n. 28, at 780.
30. GROUP OF INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS & NAVAL EXPERTS, SAN REMo MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE TO ARMED CoNFLICTS AT SEA (Doswald-Beck ed.1995) [hereinafter San Remo Manual], analyzed by
Doswald-Beck, The San Rnno Manual on InternationalLawApplicable toArmed Conflicts at Sea, 89 A.J. I. L.192(1995),
the ftrst compilation of the law of naval warfare since the London Declaration Concerning the Laws of Naval War,
Feb. 26, 1909 [hereinafter London Declaration], reprinted in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: A CoLLEcnON OF
AGREEMENTS AND DocUMENTSWI11i CoMMENTARIES (Ronzitti ed. 1988) at 223 [hereinafter LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE],
an unratifted multilateral treaty, and Instirut de Droit International, Oxford Manual ofNll1Xl1 War (1913) [hereafter
Oxford Manual], reprinted in LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra at 277. When World War I began, France and Russia
tried to comply with the Declaration; Germany and Austria-Hungary adopted parts; the United Kingdom adopted
it with additions and modifications, which were imitated by France, Italy and Russia. The Declaration became a
propaganda issue and after further modifications was withdrawn in 1916. The United Kingdom explained that it was
remming to the historic and admitted rules ofthe law ofnations. 2 O'CoNNELL,SUpra n.19, at 1104; see also CoLOMBOS,
supra n. 20, §§ 503-06. Today, the Declaration is considered to be a mixed bag of accepted rules, plus principles no
longer relevant, in modern sea warfare. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CoNFLICT (2d ed. 1959) at 109;
Kalshoven, Commentary, in LAWOF NAVAL WARFARE,supra at 257, 273-74. Nor did the Oxford Manual achieve its goal
of restating the rules. Verri, Commentary, in id. at 329, 340. Before and after these publications, naval powers have
published compilations that have received acceptance by commentators, albeit with differing views on some points.
See, e.g., U.S. Department ofthe Nauy, Commander's Handbook on the Law afNaval Operations, NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM
1-10 [hereafter NWP 9 (Rev. A)], analyzed in THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (Nav. War C. Int'l L. Stud., v. 64,
Robertson ed. 1991). Sources such as the Declaration, the Oxford Manual, the San Remo Manual and NWP 9A, can
strengthen the authority of custom or general principles and are secondary sources in anyevenL I.C.J. Statute, AIL
38(1); REsTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWOFTItE UNITED STATES secs. 102-03 (1987) [hereinafter Restatement
(Third)]; BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PuBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1990) at 5.
31. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958 [hereinafter Continental Shelf Convention], 15 U.S.T.
471,499 U.N.T.S. 311; Convention on the High Seas [hereinafter High Seas Convention], Apr. 29,1958,13 id. 2312;
450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on Fisheries and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958
[hereinafter Fishery Convention], 17 id. 138, 559 U.N.T.S. 285; Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone, Apr. 29, 1958 [hereinafter Territorial Sea Convention], 15 id. 1606; 516 U.N.T.S. 205, [collectively cited
hereinafter as the 1958 LOS Conventions]. The preamble of the High Seas Convention declares that it restates
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customary international law, and is considered to restate customary law. Many, but not all, of the provisions of the
other Conventions reflect customary international law. Annotated Supplement to NWP 9 (Rev. A),supra n. 30, para.
1.1 at 1-2 n. 4; cf. 1 O'CoNNELL, TIlE INTERNATIONAL LAW OFTIlE SEA (Shearer ed. 1982) at 385, 474-76.
32. E.g., Convention for Regulation of Whaling, SepL 13, 1931,49 StaL 3079; 155 L.N.T.S. 349, supplemented
by Convention for Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 id. 1716; 161 U.N.T.S. 72, modified by Protocol, Nov. 19,
1956, 10 U.S.T. 952; 338 U.N.T.S. 366. There are many amendments to the Protocol Schedule. See U. S. Department
of State, TREATIEStN FORCE (1995) 443-44 [hereinafter TIF].
33. E.g., 1914 SaLAS, supra n. 21, applying only to passenger ships; Regulations for Preventing Collisions at
Sea, July 15, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459; 1050 U.N.T.S. 16, [collectively hereinafter 1972 CoLREGs], reprinted in part as a
CQIIlporile document in 6 BENEDICT,supra n. 22, Doc. 34; Convention for SafeJy of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974,32 U.S.T.
47, amended by Protocol, Feb. 17, 1978,32 U.S.T. 5577 and as further amended; Proces·verbal of Rectification to
SaLAS 1974, T.I.A.S. 10626, and other amendments [hereinafter 1974 SOLAS], reprinted and summarized in 6B & 6C
BENEDICT,SUpra, Docs. 14-1, 14-2,14-6 -14-20. What began as a single treaJy in 1914 to regulate passenger liner safeJy,
and thereby minimize losses by sinkings and therefore pollution ofthe sea from fuel (e.g. oil) and cargoes, has expanded
into two sets of international agreements, SOLAS (dealing primarily with internal safeJy of vessels) and CoLREGS
(establishing rules for safe navigation of vessels in relation to each other and thereby contributing to environmental
protection through collision minimization), which contribute indirectly to a cleaner maritime environmenL Before
becoming parIy to these agreements, many States had legislation governing rules of the road, e.g. Act to Adopt
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, ch. 802, 26 StaL 320, which collectively could be argued to be State
custom on the poinL BROWNLIE, supra n. 30, at 5. Today, national legislation implements the agreements for many
countries, including navigation of internal waters, although the 1972 CoLREGS, supra, rule 1(b), 28 U.S.T. at 3467,
allows States to declare national rules for internal waters. The United States has special internal waters rules. See
Inland Rules, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2001-38 (1994); demarcation lines are published in 33 C.F.R. §§ 80.01-80.175 (1994). Of
panicular interest to navies in reducing collision risks, and therefore the risk of pollution resulting from accidents,
are incidents at sea agreements,e.g., Agreement on Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas, May 25, 1972,
USSR-U.S., 23 U.S.T. 1168; 852 U.N.T.S. 151, and Protocol; May 22, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 1063, supplemented by
Agreement on Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, June 12,1989, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 877 (1989); see also 1
BROWN, TIlE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TIlE SEA (1994) at 285; Nagle, Note, The Dangerous Miliuny Activities Agreemenl:
Minimum Order and Superpower Relalions on the World's Oceans, 31 Va. J. In!'1 L. 125 (1990).
34. Hague Convention (VIII) Relative to Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, OCL 18, 1907, Am.
1-6,36 StaL 2332, 234344; Hague Convention (IX) Concerning Bombarded by Naval Forces in Time of War, Oct.
18,1907, Am. 14, id. 2351,2363-64.
35. Protocol for Prohibition of Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods ofWarfare,June 17, 1925,94 L.N.T.S. 65, with U.S. no·fIrSt·use reservation, Dec. 16, 1974, 26 U.S.T. 571-72.
36. TreaJy on Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments, Apr. 15, 1935, Am.
1-3,49 StaL 3267, 3268-70; 167 L.N.T.S. 289,290 [hereinafter Roerich Pact].
37. See, e.g., Founh Geneva Convention, supra n. 26, Am. 14-15,18-19,53,147 and 154, whose provisions along
with Hague IX,supra n. 34, are protective of the environment when its provisions covering safe areas for the wounded,
sick and aged, and children, expectant mothers and mothers ofsmall children, hospital areas, convoys, and destrUction
of propeny, coincidentally include environmentally sensitive areas.
38. Convention for Protection of Cultural ProperIy in Event ofArmed Conflict, and Protocol, May 14, 1954,249
U.N.T.S. 21S, superseding and supplementing Hague IX, supra n. 34, and Roerich Pact, supra n. 36.
39. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinled in 21
I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 LOS Convention].
40. Guyana ratified the 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, on Nov. 16, 1993, and it is now in force for ratifying
States. As of Feb. 23, 1995, 73 States had ratified the Convention. Status oflhe Convention andAgreemenl, 6 U.S. Dep't
SL Dispatch Supp. No.1, at 53 (1995). The Clinton Administration sent the Convention to the Senate for advice and
consent, together with a supplemental protocol, commonly known as the "Boat Agreement," which would amend
pam of the deep seabed articles. The United States had declined to sign the Convention in 1982 because of
objectionable terms in anicles dealing with deep seabed mining. See President of the United States, Message
Transmilling United Nalions Convention on Ihe Law oflhe Sea, wilhAnnexes, Done al Mantego Bay, December 10, 1982 (Ihe
"Convention'?, and Ihe Agreement Relaling to the Implementalion ofPart XI oflhe United Nations Convenlion on the Law of
the Sea ofDecember 10,1982, with Annex, Adopled at New York,July 28,1994 (the "Agreement'?, and Signed by the United
Siales, Subject 10Ratijication, onJuly 28,1994, S. TreaJy Doc. No. 103-39, 103d Cong.,2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter S.Doc.
103-39], reprinled in part in 6 U.S. Dep't SL Dispatch Supp. No.1, at 1-52 (1995). Many countries have consented to
be bound by the Boat Agreement, have signed it, or have agreed to apply it provisionally. The United States is in the
last category. Slatus of the Agreement, supra. The United States has recognized the Convention's navigational
anicles-the principal interface for the law of naval warfare and the law of the sea-as representing customary
international law for over a decade. President Reagan, United Stales Ocean Policy, Mar. 10, 1983, 19 Weekly Comp.
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Pres. Doc. 383 (Mar. 14, 1983). Commentators generally agree that these Convention provisions reflect customary
international law. See, e.g., NWP 9 (Rev. A), supra n. 30,para.l.l; Restatement (Third),supra n. 30, Pan V,Introductory
Note, at 3-5 (1987); if. Moore,Introduction to I NORDQUIST, UNITED NATIONS CoNVENTION ONTHE LAW OFTHE SEA 1982:
A CoMMENTARY (1985) at xxviii; Oxman, International Law and N(l1Jal and Air Operations at Sea, in LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, supra, n. 30, at 19, 29; but see 1 O'CoNNELL, supra n. 31, at 4849. O'Connell researched id. through 1978,
using drafts of the evolving Convention, but died before the fmal version was available. Shearer made changes and
additions, publishing before fmal negotiations produced the Convention. Shearer,Editor's Preface to id., at vii. Hence,
O'Connell's volumes may reflect views of the decade before Restatement (Third), supra, was published. In 1983, the
United States claimed a 200-mile exclusive economic zone(EEZ) in accordance with 1982 LOS Convention principles.
Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10605 (Mar. 10, 1983). In 1988, the United States claimed a 12-mile territorial
sea in accordance with the Convention. Proclamation No. 5928, 54id. 777 (Dec. 27, 1988). Analysis ofthe Convention
as modified by the Boat Agreement has been favorable. See Law of the Sea Forum: The 1994 Agreement on the Seabed
Provisions ofthe Convention on the Law oftheSea, 88 A.J. I. L. 687 (1994). U.S. Department of Defense, National Security
and the Convention on the Law ofthe Sea Guly 1994) urged advice and consent, stressing the Convention's imponance
for national securiry.
41.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, An. 311(1), specifically declaring that the Convention prevails, as among
States pany to it, over the 1958 LOS Conventions, supra note 31.
42. Annotated Supplement to NWP 9 (Rev. A), supra n. 30, Table STl-1; U.N. Pub. Sales No. E.83.V.5, supra n.
39,at 190.
43. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969 [hereinafter Vienna Conventions], An. 18, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 336; SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CoNVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (2d cd. 1984) at 19,4244 (provisions
may have gone beyond customary rules); Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 312(3), cmt. i & r.n.6; U.N.G.A. Res.
59a, 38 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 47, at 48 (1983) (calling on all States to refrain from actions undermining 1982 LOS
Convention, supra n. 39).
44. The United States and many commentators have said that the Convention's navigational articles restate
customary law. See supra n. 40.
45. Diederich,supra n. 28, at 4344, notes that the U.N. Chaner has no direct reference to environmental concerns
but that this could be subsumed under W., Am. 1(3}(4).
46. U.N. Charter, ArL 103. This applies to U.N. Members' obligations under U.N. Securiry Council decisions
pursuant to Am. 25,48. Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 A.J.I.L. 83,87 (1993). ArL 103's
rule, analogous to the supremacy clause of U.S. ConsL, An. VI with respect to the laws of the 50 states of the United
States, is at variance with traditional treary construction rules. Although later treaties on the same subject usually
supersede earlier ones, the reverse-i.e., earlier treaties prevailing over later ones-is generally not true unless the
later agreement declares it is subject to the earlier one. Cf. Vienna Convention, supra n. 43 Arts. 5, 30; see also
Restatement (Third), supra, n. 30 sec. 323; SINCLAIR, supra, n. 43, at 85-87, 94-95, 160, 184-85,246.
47. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39. An 237. ArL 237 is a lexspecialis for Pan XII of the Convention, i.e., its
provisions for protecting the marine environmenL 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, para 237.7(aXI99I); 1982 LOS
Convention,supra,ArL 311(5) permits such. 5 NORDQUIST, UNITED NATIONS CoNVENTION ON THE LAW OFTHS SEA 1982:
A CoMMENTARY para 311.11, (Rosenne & Sohn eds. 1989) at 243; see also Charney, The Marine Environment and the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 28 Int'I Law. 879,884 (1994). An. 237(1) states a recognized way to
preserve the force of a prior treary, subject to the consistency limitation of ArL 237(2). Vienna Convention, supra n.
43, ArL 30(2). 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW Gennings & Watts eds. 1992) sec. 590 at 1213 [hereinafter I
OPPENHEill]; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 323(1); SINCLAIR, supra n. 43, at 97-98.
48. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 29, An. 311(2). Presumably this includes 1972 CoLREGS and 1974 SOLAS,
supra, n. 33.
49. This might be contrasted with 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39,An 311(1), expressly superseding the 1958
LOS Conventions,supra n. 31, where 1982 Convention parties are also panies to the 1958 agreements. If, in a particular
situation, a country is pany to the 1958 Conventions but is not pany to the 1982 LOS Convention, and the other
country is pany to the 1982 Convention and was parry to the 1958 Conventions, the 1958 rules apply. Vienna
Convention,supra n. 43, An. 30(4Xb); Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 323(3Xb); SINCLAIR,SUpra, n. 43 at 94. To
the extent that custom, general principles or perhaps secondary sources such as court decisions or commentators
would conflict with a treary norm in either the 1982 or the 1958 treaties at issues, those conflicting rules would be
thrown into the decision matrix. If the customary rule, principle or other source is the same as the treary rule, the
latter is strengthened. I.C.J. Statute, Am. 38, 59; Vienna Convention, supra, Preamble, Am. 38, 43 (recognizing the
independent vitaliry ofcustom); BROWNUE,SUpra n. 30 at 12-19; D'AMATO, THE CoNCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1971) at 104-06, 114, 136, 164; VON GLAItN, LAW AMONG NATIONS (5th ed.1986) at 25 (recognizing principles as
a gap-filler); 1 OPPENHEill, supra n. 47, sec. 11, at 33-36; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sees. 102-03 (recognizing
principles as primarily a gap-filler); SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1991) at 49-65, 74-81
(same); SINCLAIR, supra n. 43, at 6, 9-10,102-03; Akehurst, Custom as a Source ofInternational Law, 47 Brit. Y.B. Int'l
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L. 1,49·52 (1974); Robenson, Conumporory International Law: Relevant to Today's World?, 45 Nav. War C. Rev. 89,
91·94 (Summer 1992). High Seas Convention, supra n. 31, has been generally recognized as stating customary rules.
To the extent that these principles carry forward into the 1982 LOS Convention, they stand on quite f1rIll ground
indeed. This is particularly important in the context of the relationship among the law of the sea, the law of armed
conflict, and the emerging law of the environment as it applies to high seas operations.
50.1982 LOS Convention supra n. 39, Arts. 192·237.
51. See generally, e.g., id., Arts. 21(1)(f). 22(2), 23, 28(2), 33, 39(2)(b), 42(IXa)-42(I)(b), 42(2)42(5), 43{b), 44,
56(I)(bXiii), 56(3), 60(1), 61-72, 80, 94(4Xc), 94(7), 116, 122·23, 145-46, 147(1), 147(2Xb), 147(c), 149, 233,303; for
further analysis see 2 NORDQUIST, UNITED NATIONS CoNVENTIONONTHE LAWOFTHE SEA 1982: A CoMMENTARY, (Nandan,
et al. eds. 1993) paras. 22.1-22.9, 23·1·23·9, 39.1·39.10(l), 42.1-41.1.10(l), 43.1-43.8(e), 44.1M.8(c), 61.1·61.12(k),
62.1·62.16(1), 63.1·63.12(1), 64.1-64.(9XI), 65.1-65.16(i), 66.1·66.9(g), 67.1-67.8(e), 68.1-68.5(b), 69.1-69.17(h),
70.1-70.11(d), 7l.1-71.9(c), 72.1-71.1O(b), 303.1-303.10; S. Doc. 103·39,6 U.S. Dep't St. Dispatch, Supp. No. I, at 23,
25·28,51; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sees. 457, r.n. 7; 461, cmt. C; 512; 523(I)(bXii) & cmt.d. Some provisions
of the Convention echo the 1958 LOS Conventions. See, e.g., Fishery Convention, supra n. 31, Arts. 1·8, 13; High Seas
Convention, supra n.31, Arts. 10, 11(1), 13.
52. The Stockholm Conference also "had a great influence for later deliberations on the protection and
preservation of the marine environment" in later U.N. Committees and in the 1982 LOS Convention negotiations.
Introduction, para. XII.ll, in 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, at 8·9; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, Part IV, Introductory
Note, at 99; see also BIRNIE & BOYL!l,supra n. 28, at 39·53; Petsonik, The Role oJthe United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) in The Development oJInternationalEnvironmentalLaw, 5 Am. U.J. Int'I L. & Pol. 351 (1990). The Conference
Report included a Declaration on the Human Environment [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration] with 26 Principles,
an Action Plan for the Human Environment, and various resolutions. See 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972). Principle 6 states in
part that "[D]ischarge of toxic ••• or other substances and the release of heat in such quantities or concentrations as
to exceed the capacity of the environment to render them harmless, must be halted ••• to ensure that serious or
irreversible damage is not inflicted on ecosyustems." Principle 7 declares that "States shall take all possible steps to
prevent pollution of the seas by substances .•• liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and
marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea..••" Principle 21 says States must
achieve a balance between exploiting their resources and their responsibility to see that this does not harm others'
environments:
States have, in accordance with the [U.N. Charter] and the principles ofinternationallaw, the sovereign right
to exploit their own resoutces pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or
of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Principle 22 would require "States [to] co·operate to develop further the international law regarding liability and
compensation for the victims ofpollution and other environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction
or control of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction..••" Principle 26 protested nuclear weapons, and other
weapons of mass destruction, with a plea for agreements to eliminate and destroy them. Id, at 1418, 1420·21. U.N.
Environmental Programme Participation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93·188, sec. 2, 87, Stat. 713, declared U.S.
Congressional policy "to participate in coordinating efforts to solve environmental problems of global and
international concern .•••" Two years later, U.N.G.A. Res. 3281, CharteroJEconomicRights and Duties oJStates, at Arts.
29·30, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975), reiterated nations' duties to use the sea for peaceful purposes to preserve the
environment. These resolutions, except insofar as they restated customary or conventional law, were not binding on
U.N. Members. U.N. Charter, Arts. 10, 14. See infra n. 62 and accompanying text.
53. Kuwait Regional Convention for Co·operation on Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution,
Apr. 24, 1978, 1140 U.N.T.S. 133 [hereinafter Kuwait Regional Convention]; Protocol concerning Co·operation in
Combating Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Case of Emergency, Apr. 24, 1978, 1140 U.N.T.S. 201
[hereinafter Kuwait Protocol]. All countries bordering the Persian Gulfwere signatories: Baharain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, U.A.E. The Convention and Protocol went into force July 1, 1979. Salter, supra n. 2, at
351. Kuwait Regional Convention. Protocol on Pollution Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the
Continental Shelf, Mar. 29, 1989, has been signed. 1 BROWN, supra n. 33, at 355·56.
54. Convention for Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment, Feb 14, 1982, reprinted in 2
WALLACE, supra n. 20, at 2282 [hereinafter Red Sea Convention]; Protocol Concerning Regional Co·operation in
Combating Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful substances in Cases of Emergency, Feb 14,1982 [hereinafter Red Sea
Protocoll, reprinted in id. at 2293. Signatories inc1udeJordan, Palestine Liberation Organization for Palestine, People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen Arab Republic, all bordering the Red Sea
and Gulf of Aden, but any Arab League member can accede to the Convention. Red Sea Convention, supra, Preamble,
Art. 26(2), id, at 2282, 2291.
55. See generally, DOD REPORT, supra n. 2, at 48·63,88·181,221.
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56. E.g., Kuwait Regional Convention, supra n. 53, Arts. 16-18; Kuwait Protocol, supra n. 53, Arts. 3, 5-13; Red
Sea Convention,supra n. 54, Arts. 16-20,22,24; Red Sea Protocol,supra n. 54, Arts. 3, 5-13. Another recent example,
involving U.S. participation, is a package ofagreements governing protection of the South Pacific Ocean. Convention
for Protection ofNatural Resources and Environment ofthe South Pacific Region, Nov. 24, 1986,reprinted in 26 I.L.M.
38(1986); Protocol for Prevention of Pollution of the South Pacific Region by Dumping, Nov. 24, 1986, reprinted in id,
65 (1986); Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combating Pollution Emergencies in the South Pacific Region, Nov.
24,1986, reprinted in id, 59 (1986); see also U.S. Understanding, S. Treaty Doc. 101-21, at 53.
57. See, e.g., 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39,Arts. 23, 39, 41(5), 43(a), 94(4Xc), 94(5), 197,200-02,207-12,217,
221-22,303; see also 5 NORDQtDST supra n. 47, paras. 311.8m 311.11.
58. Vienna Convention, supra n. 43, Preamble, Arts. 38,43.
59. See generally lC.J. Statute, Arts. 38, 59; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, §§ 102"()3.
60. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) [hereinafter Nicaragua Case],
1986I.C.J. 14,31-38,91-135; CoifU Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.e.J. 4, 22.
61.Akehurst, supra n. 49, at 49-52. The 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 22(1), seems to anticipate this
possibility with respect to proportionate anticipatory action to ward off pollution threats. Art. 310 states:
Article 309 does not preclude a State, when signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, from
making declarations or statements, however phrased or named, with a view, inter alia, to the
harmonization of its laws and regulations with the provisions of this Convention, provided that
such declarations or statements do not purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of the
provisions of this Convention in their application to the State.
ArL 309 forbids reservations or exceptions to the Convention and is the reason for the Boat Agreement, supra n. 40,
to amend Part XI of the Convention. See supra n.4O and accompanying texL Such statements, taken collectively,
arguably could articulate custom apan from the Convention. However, occasional presence of clear, contradictory
authorizations for custom, e.g., Art 22(1), plus the "obscurity and uncertainty" ofArt. 310's meaning-;:f. 5 NORDQtDST,
supra n. 47, para 310.5-indicate that custom and other sources can be considered alongside Convention norms.
Certainly this is true for the law of naval warfare, largely customary in source, which enters through the "other rules"
clauses, with which the Convention is replete.
62. U.N. Members must comply with Security Council "decisions" under U.N. Charter, Arts, 25,41,48; these
supersede treaty obligations. !d., Art. 103; Reisman, Constitutional Crisis, supra n. 46 at 87. The Council may also
recommend action or call upon States for action pursuant to U.N. Charter, Arts. 39-41, or the General Assembly may
recommend action under id., Arts. 10, 14, but these resolutions do not have the binding force of decisions, although
they may restate customary or treaty norms and thereby strengthen them. BAILEY, THE PROCEDURE OF TIlE U.N.
SECURiTY CoUNCIL (2d ed.1988) ch. 3.6; BROWNLIE, supra n. 30, at 5, 699-700; CASTENADA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED
NATIONS REsOLUTIONS (Amoia trans. 1969) at ch.3.j; GoODRICH et al., CHARTER OF TIlE UNITED NATIONS (3d rev. ed.
1969) 111-14, 141-45,207-11,290-314,334-37,614-17; Restatement (Third), supra, n. 30, sccs. 102, cmL g; 103(2Xd),
cmt. c & r.n.2; SCHACHTER, supra n. 49, ch. 6; SIMMA, THE CHARTEROFTIIE UNITED NATIONS: A CoMMENTARY (1994),
at 236-42, 270-87, 409-18, 614-16, 618, 626-28, 631-35, 651, 1118-25.
63.Jus cogem is a fundamental norm that would override rules in treaties and custom, two primary sources of
international law stated in, e.g., I.C.J. Statute, Arts. 38, 59; Restatement (Second), supra n. 30,secs. 102-03. Its contours
are vague and depend on a commentator's views, which can range from expansive (e.g., those of the former U.S.S.R.,
whose jurisprudence may still have influence) to totally deprecatory. See generally Vienna Convention,supra n. 43, at
53,64, considered by SINCLAIR, supra n.43, at 17-18,218·26, to be progressive development; ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW
OF TREATIES, (1974) at 177-87; I OPPENHEIM, supra n. 47, sccs. 2, at 8 & n. 2; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30 sec.
338(e); TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, (Butler trans. 1974) at 98; Alexidze, Legal Nature ofJus Cogens in
Contemporary International Law, 172 R.C.A.D.l 219, 262·63 (1981); Hazard, Soviet Tactics in InternationalLaw Making,
7 Den. J. Int'I L. & Pol. 9, 25 (1977); Arechaga, International Law in the Past 17zird ofa Century, 159 RC.A.Dol. 1,68
(1978); Weisburd, 17ze Emptiness ofthe Cancept ofJus Cogens. As Illustrated by the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 Mich.
J. Int'I L. 1 (1995). The I.C.J. held in the Nicaragua Case, supra n. 60, that U.N. Charter, Art. 2(4), was customary law
having the character of jus cogem. The 1979 U.S.S.R invasion of Afghanistan, pursuant to a 1978 agreement, was
condemned in part under Vienna Convention, supra, Art. 53 principles. States-International Status, Attrihutes &
Types, 1979 Digest sec. I, at 34, quoting Memorandum from Owen, U.S. Department of State Legal Adviser, to
Christopher, Acting Secretary of State, Dec. 29, 1979. A more interesting issue, left unanswered by the Charter, is the
place of customary law or general principles varying from the Charter's terms as a treaty. This was not resolved in the
Nicaragua Case, supra. The Charter, Art. 103, speaks of "obligations" under treaties, and whether this includes custom
and perhaps principles, is debatable. SIMMA, supra n. 62, at 1118-25, would argue for Charter supremacy. Perhaps 1
OPPENHEIM,supra, would agree ifthe Charter norm isjus cogem in nature. One competing factor is the force ofnational
sovereignty; if U.N. Members gave up freedom to make treaties to the measure of U.N. Charter, ArL 103, that does
not necessarily mean that they gave up the sovereign right to build contrary custom, under this theory. See e.g., U.N.
Charter, Arts. 2(1), 2(7); 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, AIL 157(3); Vienna Convention, supra n.43, Preamble;

Walker

211

U.N. Secretary·General,AnAgendafor Peace: Report ofthe Secretary-General on the Work ofthe Organization, U.N. Doc.
A/47/277 S/2411 (1991), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 956, 959 (1992); S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser.A) 4, 18
[hereinafter LDtus Case]; S.S. Wimbledon CD.K. v. Ger.), 1923 id., No.1, at 15, 25; Declaration of Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations Among States, U.N.G.A. Res. 2625, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292;
BROWNLlE,mpra n. 30, ch. 13; Anand,SO'Dereign EqualityofStates in International Law, 197 C.A.D.!. 9, 22-51, 189 (1986);
Fitzmaurice, The General Principles ofInternational Law Consideredfrom the Standpoint ofthe Rule ofLaw, 92 id, 49-50
(1957); Lachs, The Development and General Trends ofInternational Law in OurTtime, 169 id, 1,77-84 (1980); Waldock,
General Coune on Public International Law, 106 id, 1, 156-72 (1962).
64. Compare e.g., 1982 LOS Convention, mpra n. 39, Preamble, Arts. 2(3) (territorial sea), 19,21,31 (innocent
passage), 342(2) (straits transit passage), 45 (straits innocent passage, incorporation by reference of Arts. 19,21,31),
52(1) (archipelagic sea lanes passage), 58(1), 58 (3) (EEZs), 78(2) (continental shelf; coastal State cannot infringe or
interfere with "navigation and other rights and freedoms of other States as provided in this Convention), 87(1) (high
seas), 138 (the Area), 303(4) (archaeological, historical objects found at sea; "other international agreements and rules
of international law regarding the protection of objects of an archaeological and historical nature"), with e.g., High
Seas Convention, mpra n. 31, Art. 2, Territorial Sea Convention, mpra n. 31, An.!. Although the other 1958 LOS
Conventions do not include specific "other rules" clauses, they state that they do not affect the status of waters above
as high seas, in the case of the continental shelf, or other high seas rights, in the case of high seas fisheries. Continental
ShelfConvention,mpra n. 31, Arts. 1,3,15; Fishery Convention,mpra n. 31, Arts. 1-8,13.
65.1982 LOS Convention,mpra n. 39,Art. 87(1).
66.The General Assembly elects 34 members to the I.L.C. after nominations by governments. The 1958 LOS
Conventions, mpra n. 31, emerged through the I.L.C. See generally, BRIGGS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW CoMMISSION
(1969); BROWNLIE, mpra n. 30 at 30-31; SCHACHTER, mpra n. 49, at 66-69, 71-72; Briggs, Reflections on the CodijiClllion
ofInternational Law by the International Law Commission and by Other Agencies, 126 R.C.A.D.I. 233 (1969); Jennings,
The Progressive Development of International Law and Its Codification, 24 Brit. Y.B. In!,1 L. 301, 310-29 (1947);
Lauterpacht, CodifICation and Development ofInternational Law, 49 A.J.I.L. 16 (1955); Rosenne, The International Law
Commission, 1949-59, 30 Brit. Y.B. In!'1 L. 104 (1960).
67. International Law Commission, Commentary on Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in Reponofthe
Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1 (1966) reprinted in 1962(2) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n
267-68; Briggs, Unilateral Denunciation ofTreaties: The Vienna Convention and the International COUT/ofJustice, 68 A.J.I.L.
51 (1974); Boczek,PeacejulPurposes Provisions ofthe United Nations Convention on the Law ofthe Sea, 20 Ocean Devel.
& Int'l L. 359 (1989); Christol & Davis, Cuban Quarantine: The NtrDal Interdiction of Offensive Weapons andAssociated
Material to Cuba, 1961, 57 A.J.I.L. 525, 53940 (1963); Davidson, United States Protection ofRejlagged Kuwaiti Vessels
in the Gulf War: The LegalImplications, 4 Int'l J. Estuarine & Coastal L. 173, 178 (1989); Fenrick, Legal Aspects ofthe
Falklands NtrDal Conflict, 24 Mil. L. & L. of War Rev. 243, 245 (1983); Lowe, The Commander's Handbook on the Law
ofNtrDal Operations and the Contemporary Law ofthe Sea in LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONs,mpra n. 30,at 109, 132; Oxman,
The Regime of Warships Under the United Nations Corrventions on the Law of the Sea, 24 Va. J. In!'l L. 809, 811 (1984);
Ronziui, The Crisis ofthe Traditional Law Reguiating InternationalArmed Conflicts at Sea and the Needfor Its Revision in
LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, mpra n. 30, at 15; Russo, Neutrality at Sea, mpra n. 9, at 384; Thorpe, Mine Waifare at
Sea - Some Legal Aspects of the Future, 18 id, 255, 257 (1987); Wolfrum, Rejlagging and Escort Operations in the Persian
Gulfi An InternationalLaw Perspective, 29 Va.J. In!'1 L. 386, 391-92 (1982). Apparent dissenters include 2 O'CoNNELL,
mpra n.19,at 1112-13,referrlngtoid, 747-69, in the context of the nationalityofmerchant ships; Low & Hodgkinson,
mpra n. 2, at 421, who discuss Iraq's environmental protection obligations in the LOS context and say nothing about
the clauses, although id 438-42 elliptically seems to recognize the principle; Okorodudu-Fubara,mpra n. 2, at 195-97;
Rauch, The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of VICtims ofInternational Armed Conflicts and
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Repercussions on the Law ofNtrDal Waifare: Report to the Committee
on the Protection ofHuman Life in Armed Conflict of the Society for Military Law of War 22-49a Guly 1983) (manuscript
in author's possession). 1 BROWN, mpra n. 33, at 280 recognizes the similar "other rules" clauses pertaining to high
seas rights but declares that "freedom ofthe high seas must be exercised under conditions laid down in the Convention
and by other unspecified rules ofinternationallaw." 3 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTIONONTIiE LAWOFTIiE SEA 1982: A
CoMMENTARY, (Nordquist ed. 1995) [hereinafter 3 NORDQUIST] at para. 87.9(i) states that "Uses of the high seas for
military purposes-though restricted in other maritime zones, comes within the scope of the freedom of the high
seas," citing to 1982 LOS Convention, mpra n. 39, Arts. 19(2)(b), 19(2Xf), 52(2), (innocent passage). Similar clauses
in High Seas Convention,mpra n. 31, Art. 2, had been interpreted to include freedom to undenake scientific research,
to explore or exploit high seas subsoil resources and to test nuclear weapons. These are now regulated by 1982 LOS
Convention,mpra, Parts XI & XIII; Treaty on Prohibition of Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons
of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971,23 U.S.T. 704;
955 U.N.T.S. 115 [hereinafter Seabed Treaty].
68. 1982 LOS Convention, mpra n. 39, Art. 88. The Convention also says that Area use is reserved for peaceful
purposes, and marine scientific research must be conducted for peaceful purposes. Id., Arts. 141, 143(1), 147(2Xd),
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155, 240(a), 242(1), 246(3). Ensuing analysis will be confined to Art. 88; conclusions with respect to it apply mutatis
mutandis to other "peaceful purposes" provisions. The language originated in Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, Art. 1(1),
12 U.S.T. 794, 795; 402 U.N.T.S. 71, 72 and is in Treaty on Principles Governing Activities of States in Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, Art. 4, 18 id. 2410, 2413-14;
610 U.N.T.S. 205, 207 [hereinafter Space Treaty]; ENMOD Convention, supra n. 24, Art. 3(1), 31 id. at 336; 1108
U.N.T.S. at 153; Agreement Governing Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dee. 5, 1979,
Art. 3(1), 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, 22.
69. Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, § 521, cmL b, citing U.N. Charter, Art. 2(4); 1982 LOS Convention,supra
n. 39, Arts. 88 & 301, and referring to Restatement (Third), supra, § 905, cmt. gj accord, Russo, Targeting Theory in the
Law ofNaval Waifare, 30 Nav. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1992); see also 2 NORDQUlST,supra, n. 67, paras. 87.9(i), 88.1-88-7(d). Boczek,
supra n. 67; Oxman, Regime of Warships, supra n. 67, at 814, 829-32j Parkerson, International Legal Implications ofthe
Strategic Defense Initiative, 116 Mil. L. Rev. 67, 79-85 (1987).
70. U.N. Charter, Art. 103j see also supra n. 46 and accompanying texL
71. See supra nn. 46-49 and accompanying texL
72. U.N. Charter, Art. 51; see also S. Doc. 103-39, 6 U.S. Dep't St. Dispatch, Supp. No.1, at 51. There is a debate
as to whether anticipatoty self-defense, as opposed to "reactive" self-defense where an aggressor must strike the first
blow before a right of self-defense is triggered, is permitted in the Charter era. The U.S. view, supported by many
researchers, is that anticipatotyself-defense is permissible in the Charter era under Caroline Case limitations, i.e. when
there is a clear necessity that is instant, overwhelming and leaves no choice of peaceful means,see NWP 9A, supra n.
30, para. 4.3.2.1, citing Caroline Case, letter of U.S. Secretaty of State Daniel Webster to U.K. Ambassador Lord
Alexander B. WashbUrton, Aug. 6, 1842,2 MooRE, DIGEST411-l2j letterofSecretaty Websterto U.K. Minister Henty
S. Fox, Apr. 24, 1841, in 1 SHEWMAKER, THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS (1983) at 58, 67. Some
scholars take the opposite view. See generally BoWEIT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1958) at 187-93 ;
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TIlE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963) at 257-61, 275-78, 366-67; DINSTEIN, WAR,
AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE (1988) at 86,174-79; HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES (1995) at
121-25; MCDOUGAL & FEUCthNO, LAw AND MINLIIUM WORLD PUBUC ORDER (1961) at 232-41; MCNhlR & WATTS, TilE
LEGAL EFFECTS OF WAR (4th ed. 1966) at 16, 18 ; O'CONNELL, TilE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER (1979) at 83; 1
OPPENHELII, supra n. 47, sec. 127; SCilAClITER, supra n. 49, at ISO-52; SI1IMA, supra n. 54, at 675-76; STONE, AGGRESSION
AND WORLD ORDER (1958) at 44; Bunn, InternationalLaw and the Use ofForcein Peacetime: Do U.S. Ships Have to Take
the First Hit?, 39 Nav. War C. Rev. 69-70 (1986); Greenwood,Remarks, in Panel, Neutrality, The Rights ofShipping and
the Use afForce in the Persian Gulf War (Part 1), 1988 Proe. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 158, 159-61 (1990); Lagoni, Remarks, in
id. 161, 162; Linnan, Self-Defense, Necessity and U.N. Collective Security: United States and Other Views, 1991 Duke J.
Compo & Inri L. 57, 65-84,122; Lowe, supra n. 67,at 127-30; McHugh, ForcibleSelf-Help in IntemationalLaw, 25 Nav.
War C. Rev. 61 (No.2, 1972); Reisman, Criteriaforthe Use afForce in International Law, 10 Yale J. Int'l L. 279 (1985);
Turner, State Sovereignty, International Law, and the Use ofForce in Countering Low-Intensity Aggression in the Modern
World, in LEGAL AND MORAL CoNSTRMNTSON Low-INTENSITY CoNFUCT (Nav. War C. Inri L. Stud., v. 67, Coli, et al.
eds.1995)at 43,62-80; Waldock, TheRegulation ofthe UseofForceby IndividualStatesinInternationalLaw, 81 R.C.A.D.I.
451,496-99 (1952). Lowe, supra n. 67 at 128, notes that the Nicaragua Case, supra n. 60, at 93, specifically excluded
considering anticipatoty self-defense, and that States will likely rely on it more in the future.
73. See supra nn. 31-33 and accompanying texL
74. E.g., Civil Liability Convention, supra n. 22, Art. 3(1), (exclusion ofliability due to "act of war, hostilities,
civil war, [or] insurrection"). The Convention has been modified by 1976 Protocol,supra n. 22, and would be further
modified by 1984 Protocol, Art. 3, reprinted in 6 Benedict, supra n. 22, Doc. 6A, which extended coverage to parties'
declared EEZs, or to a 200-mile belt offcoasts of States that have not declared one. The 1992 Protocol,supra n. 22,id.,
Doc. 6B, modifies the Convention in ways irrelevantto this analysis. See generally 2 O'CoNNELL, supra n.19, at 1008-10.
Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7,1944, Art. 89, 61 StaL 1180, 1205; 15 U.N.T.S. 295,356, declares
that it applies during war.
75. E.g., Convention for Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May 12, 1954 [hereinafter 1954 Oil Pollution
Convention], Art. 19, 12 U.S.T. 2989, 3004; 327U.N.T.S. 3, 18; amendments, Apr. 11, 1962, 17 id. 1523; 600 U.N.T.S.
332, and OeL 21,1969,28 id. 1205, do not affect this Article; Treaty for Establishment of the European Economic
Community, Mar. 15, 1957, Arts. 223-26, 1973 Gr. BriL T.S. No.1- Part II (Cmd. 5179-11),298 U.N.T.S. 3, 88-89.
76. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, Art. 2204, T.I.A.S. No. --,reprinted in 32 I.L.M.
289,605,702 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA). NAFTA has many environmental protection provisions. NAFTA, supra,
Arts. 104, 709-24, 901-15, 1101, 1114, 2005, 2014-15, 2101, analyzed in MhGRAW, NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS (1995) ch.l; Baker,Ajier the NAFTA, 27 Int'l Law. 765, 769 (1993); Garvey, Trade Law and
QualityofLife-DisputeResolution UndertheNAFTA SideAccords on LaborandtheEnvironment, 89 A.J.I.L. 439 (1995);
Ludwiszewski, "Green" Language in the NAFTA; Reconciling Free Trade and EnvironmentalProteaion, 27 Inri Law. 691
(1993); Stewart, The NAFTA: Trade, Competition, Environmental Protection, id. 751 (1993). NAFTA includes a specific
national security exception, stating inter alia that nothing in it shall be construed to prevent a party from taking actions
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it considers necessary to protect its "essential security interests," taken during war or other emergency in international
relations, or to prevent a party from acting pursuant to its obligations under the U.N. Charter for maintaining
international peace and security. NAFTA, supra, Arts. 2102(1)(b}2102(c). A potentially hemispheric agreement,
NAFTA is subject to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61(5,6) Stat., 55-61 U.N.T.S.
[hereinafter GATIl; TIF, supra n. 32, at 355-58, lists GATT amendments. NAFTA, supra, Art.l03(1). GATT, supra,
Art. 21,61(5), is similar to NAFTA,supra, Art. 2102.
77. E.g., Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol, supra n. 53; Red Sea Convention and Protocol, supra n. 54.
78. See supra n. 31 and accompanying text.
79. Cf. I.e.J. Statute, Arts. 38, 59; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sccs. 102-03; see also supra nn. 49,58-61 and
accompanying text.
80. Vienna Convention, supra n. 43, Art. 61; see also ELIAS, supra n. 63, at 128-30; Restat~ment (Third), supra n.
30, § 336, cmt. c & r.n. 3; SmcLAlR,supra n. 43, at 190-92; International Law Commission, Report on the Work ofits
Eighteenth Session, Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. N6309/Rev. 1 [hereinafter LL.C.
Report), reprinted in 2(1974) Y.B. In!'l L. Comm'n 171,255-56 (noting relative rarity of the practice). MCNhIR, THE
LAW OF TREhTlES (2d ed. 1961) at 685 does not recognize a separate doctrine, butsome of his hypothetical examples
arc impossibility situations.
81. Vienna Convention, supra n. 43, Art. 62, said declaratory of customary law by Fisheries Jurisdiction CO.K.
v.lce.), 1973 I.C.J. 3, 18; see also I.L.e. Report, supra n. 80, at 257-58; Restatement (Third),supra n. 30,sec. 336 & r.n.
1; SINCLAlR,supra n. 43, at 20, 192-96; Sharp,supra n. 2, at 24-25. For criticism ofthe Convention approach, substituting
a new tertn -fundamental change of circumstances - for the traditional rebus sic stantibus phrase in revising the
rules, see DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREhTY TERMINATION (1975) ch. 1; Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances,
61 A.J.I.L. 895 (1967). ELIAS,supra n. 63, at 119-28, says the traditional view ofrebus sic stantibus is no longer admissible
today. For further analysis of pre-Convention practicc,see Bedertnan, The 1871 Declaration. Rebus Sic Stantibus and a
Primitivist View ofthe Law ofNations, 81 A.J.I.L. 1(1988); Haraszti, Treaties and the Fundamental Change ofCircumstances,
146 RC.A.D.I. 1 (1975). U.S. practice has recognized the principle in what today would be considered a maritime
environmental context. See Lissitzyn, supra, at 908-11.
82. Vienna Convention, supra n. 43, takes no position on the impact of artned conflict on treaties. Attempts to
insert a Convention provision were defeated. Kearney & Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 A.J.I.L. 495, 557 (1970).
Other sources must be examined for applicable law in such situations. Briggs, Unilateral Denunciation, supra n. 67, at
51. Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 336 cmt. e & r.n. 4, says war may be a basis for a fundamental change of
circumstances claim. Others have considered war as a separate ground. See, e.g., Institut de Droit International, The
Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, Aug. 28, 1985, 61(2) Annuaire 278 (1986); Institut de Droit International,
Regulations Regarding the Effect of War on Treaties, 1912, 7 A.J.I.L. 153 (1913); Clark 'D. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947);
Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S. 231 (1929); Techl'D. Hughes, 128 N.E. 185, 191 (N.Y.), ccrt. denied, 254 U.S. 643
(1920); 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW sec. 99(4}(5) (Lauterpacht, ed., 7th ed. 1952); Davis, The Effects of War
Upon International Conventions and Private Contracts, 1927 Proc. Am. Soc'y In!,1 L. 124-29; Fitzmaurice, TheJudicial
Clauser ofthe Peace Treaties, 73 Re.A.D.I. 255, 307-17 (1948); Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art.
35(b), 29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 657, 664-65 (1935); Hurst, The Effea of War on Treaties,2 Brit. Y.B. In!'1 L. 37 (1921); Lenoir,
The Effect of War on Bilateral Treaties, with Special Reference ta Reciprocal Inheritance Treaty Provisions, 34 Geo. L.J. 129
(1946); Sharp, supra n. 2, at 23-24.
83. Institut de Droit International, supra n. 82, Arts. 3-4,61(2) Annuaire at 280; id., Regulations Regarding the
Effect of War on Treaties, Art. 5, 7 A.J.I.L. 154; 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST (1943) sec. 513, at 383-84; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra
n. 82,sec. 99(2), 99(5); Fitzmaurice,Judicial Clauses,supra n. 82, at 312; Harvard Draft Convention,supra n. 82, Art.
35(a), 29 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 664; Hurst, supra n. 82, at 42.
84.U.N. Charter,Art. 2(2); Vienna Convention,supra n. 43,Art. 26; BROWNLIE, supra n. 30, at 616; I.L.C. Report,
supra note 80, at 211; KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Knight trans. 1967) at 216; MCNAIR, supra n. 80, at 493-505;
Restatement (Third),supra n. 30,sec. 321; Friedmann, The Uses of"General Principles" in the Development ofInternational
Law, 57 A.J.I.L. 279, 286-87 (1963); Harvard Draft Convention,supra n. 82,Art. 20, 29id., Supp. at 661; Hassan, Good
Faith ill Treaty Formation, 21 Va. J. In!'l L. 443, 480-81 (1981); Nicaragua Case, supra n. 63, 1986 I.C.J. at 135-42. ELIAS,
supra n. 63, at 43-44,says thatpactasuntservanda cannot beajus cogens principle, as KELSEN,supra, would argue, because
it is subject to exceptions, e.g., fundamental change of circumstances.
85. Vienna Convention, supra n. 43, Art. 18; see also supra n. 43 and accompanying text.
86. See generally Symposium, State Succession in the Former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, 33 Va. J. Int'l L.
253 (1993); Walker, Integration and Disintegration in Europe: Reordering the Treaty Map of the Continent, 6 Transnat'l
Law. 1 (1993).
87. For an example, see supra nn. 31 & 40 and accompanying text.
88. I.C.J. Statute, Arts. 38, 59; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, seer. 102-03; see also supra nn. 49 & 60 and
accompanying text.
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89. "In at least one respect [its terms] are more restrictive than customary international law, namely in the case
of the territorial sea." 2 O'CoNNELL, supra n. 19, at 994; Charney,Marine Environment, supra n. 47, at 887.
90. S. Doc.103-39,supra n. 4O,reprinred in 6 U.S. Dep't SL Dispatch Supp. No.1, at 19.
91. E.g., 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Am. 1(IX4)-1(IX5), 21, 23, 39, 41, 43, 54, 56(I)(bXiii), 60(3), 63,
66-67,94(7), 116, 123(b), 14547, 155(2), 162, 165.
92. !d., Art. 192; compare Stockholm Declaration, supra n. 52, Principle 7; see also 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, at
3643. The U.S. Department of Defense and the Navy view AIL 236 of the Convention and Part XII "as a mandate to
ensure responsibility for environmentally sound practices." Schachte, The Value of the 1982 U.N. Convention on the
Law ofthe Sea: Preserving Our Freedoms and Protecting the Environment, 23 Ocean Deve!. & Int'l L. 55, 61 (1992).
93. See generally 2 NORDQUlST,SUpra n. 51,para.1.23, arguing for an evolving conceptual definition; 4 NORDQUIST,
supra n. 20, para. 192.11(a); Tolbert, Defining the Environment, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra, n. 2 at 259.
94. S. Doc. 103·29, supra n. 4O,reprinredin 6 U.S. Dep't SL Dispatch Supp. No.1, at 19.
95. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 1(IX4); see also 2 NORDQUIST, supra n. 50, paras. l.l-1.15, 1.22-1.24,
1.26-1.31; The LOS definition means that the environment is both human and nature centered. See Tolbert, supra n.
93, at 259.
96. 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Art. 193; compare Stockholm Declaration, supra n. 52, Principle 12, 11 id.
at 1419; see also 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, at 4549. Vallatta, Protection and Preservation o/the Marine Environment and
Marine Scientific Research at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law ofthe Sea, in Symposium, The Law of the
Sea: Where Now, 46 L. & Contemp. Probs. 146, 149 (1983) said the duty to preserve and protect the environment is a
jus cogens norm.
97. "Significant" is not stated as part of the duty in this part ofthe Convention, but other Convention provisions,
regional agreements, and commentators have added terms like "major," "serious," "significant" or "substantia!." See,
e.g., 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 94(7), 233; Kuwait Protocol, supra n. 53, Art. 1(2); Red Sea Protocol,
supra n. 54, AIL 1(2); Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, secs. 601(I)(b}601(3), 603(IXa), 603(2); Low & Hodgkinson,
supra n. 2, at 422-23. Such sources, when combined, can evidence custom. BROWNLIE, supra n. 30, at 5.
98. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 194(1); see also Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 603(2). The
"prevention" theme was partly derived from High Seas Convention, supra n. 31, Am. 24-25, and limitation to
"capabilities" from Stockholm Declaration,supra n. 52, Principle 7; 4 NORDQUlST,SUpra n. 20, paras. 194.1, 194.1O(b).
Diligent prevention and control are probably binding norms. Cf, BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra n. 28, at 95.
99. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, AIL 194(2); Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, §§ 601(IXb), 601(2),
603(IXa),603(2).
100. 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, para. 194.1O(e).
101. Dumping is defined in 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, AIL 1(IX5); see also 2 NORDQUIST, supra n. 51,
paras. 1.l-1.l5, 1.24, 1.26-1.31.
102.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39,Art.194(3); compare Protocol ofl978 Relating to International Convention
for Prevention ofPollution from Ships, 1973,Feb.17, 1978, T.I.A.S. No.-, 134OU.N.T.S. 61,incorparatingbyreference
and amending Convention for Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184 [hereinafter
collectively MARPOL 73n8], Art. 2(2), Annex II, 1340 U.N.T.S. at 184,233, defining "harmful substance," not
explained in the 1982 Convention. 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, para. 194.1O(j). Art. 194(3) is broader in sweep than
MARPOL 73n8. The language in id., AIL 2(2), defining pollution, is the same as 1982 LOS Convention, supra, ArL
1(IX4). MARPOL 73n8 parties represent 92 percent of the Earth's merchant tonnage. BOWMAN & HARRIS,
MULTILATERAL TREATIES (11th Cum. Supp. 1995) at 295. It is a fair assumption that its terms represent customary
law; therefore, similar terms used in similar circumstances in the 1982 LOS Convention also restate custom. BROWNLIE,
supra n. 30, at 5. The injury must be significant, however. See supra n. 97 and accompanying texL
103. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, ArL 194(4). This restates a customary norm. 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20,
para. 194.10(n); Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 601 & cmL a, r.n.l, citing inter alia Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, Art. 19(3Xd), Report of the International Law Commission, 2(2) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 96, 31 U.N.
G.A.O.R., Supp. No. 10, at 226 (1976).
104. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, ArL 194(5). Ice-covered areas, governed by id., AIL 234, are an example
ofsuch sensitive environments. 4 NORDQuIST,supra n. 20, para. 194.10(0), noting that International Law Commission,
Report ()11 the Work ofthe 42d Sessi()1l, ch.lV, para. 312, sec. C, item 2, AIL 22, Commentary, para. (2),45 U.N. G.A.O.R.,
Supp. No. 10 (1990), reprinted in 2(2) Y.B. In!'1 L. Comm'n 57 (1990) defines "ecosystem" as "an ecological unit ••• of
living and non-living components that are interdependent and function as a community." 1982 LOS Convention,
supra, does not define the term.
lOS. 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, ArL 195; see also 4 NORDQUIST,supra n. 20, paras. 195.2, 195.6.
106.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, AIL 196.
107.4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, paras. 196.1, 196.7(a).
108. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, AIL 197, partly based on Stockholm Declaration, supra n. 52, Recomm.
92, 11 id. at 1456-57, and Convention on Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter,
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Dec. 29,1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter London Dumping Convention]. 4 NORDQUIST, supra n.
20, para. 197.3.
109. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 200.01; see also 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, paras. 200.1-200.6,
201.1-201.7; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 603(2). Freedom of the high seas includes the right to conduct
scientific research, subject to coastal State continental shelf rights. 1982 LOS Convention, supra, Art. 87(1). It is
generally accepted as a customary right. 1 BROWN, supra n. 33, at 429.
110. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 202-06, based in pan on Stockholm Declaration, supra n. 52,
Principles 16,21,11 id. at 1419-20; National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. sec. 4332 (1994); 4 NORDQUIST, supra
n. 20, paras. 20l.1-202.6(b), 203.1-203.5(c), 204.1-204.8(d), 205.1-205.6(c), 206.1-206.6{c).
111.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Art. 198. "IMO is as important in its particular fields ofinterest-maritime
safety and protection of the marine environment-as is the UNEP at global leveL" BIRNIE & BoyLE, supra n. 28, at 53.
112.4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, para. 198.1; see also Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 601, emt. e & r.n.4, citing
inter alia Memorandum of Intent Concerning Transboundary Air Pollution, Aug. 5, 1980, Can.-U.S., 32 U.S.T. 2521;
1274 U.N.T.S. 235.
113. This "to some extent anticipates" 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Art. 221. 4 NORDQUlST,supra n. 20, para.
198.1.
114. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 199; see also 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, noting that High Seas
Convention, supra n. 31, Art. 25(2), requires countries to cooperate with competent international organizations in
measures to prevent radioactive materials contamination of the seas or airspace. The 1982 Convention, supra, covers
a wider spectrum of required cooperation.
115. This "to some extent anticipates" 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Art. 221. 4 NORDQUlST,supra n. 23, para.
198.1.
116. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 207(1)-207(2), 208(1-208(3), 209(2), 211(2); see also 4 NORDQUIST,
supra n. 20, paras. 207.7(a)-207.7(b), 208.10(a)-208.10(d), 209.10(a), 211.15(1); Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec.
603(lXa). As id. r.n. 7 shows, the United States, like many nations, has marine pollution legislation which may require
amendment to align it with Convention standards. Such laws, if enacted worldwide, can evidence customary nortOs.
BROWNUE, supra n. 30, at 5.
117.4 NORDQUlST,supra n. 20, para. 208.10(a).
118. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 210(1)-210(3), 210(6); see also 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, para.
210.11(b); Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, § 603. National laws, such as those in id., r.n.7, can evidence custom.
BROWNUE, supra n. 30, at 5.
119. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 210(5); see also 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, paras. 210.11(c)-210.11(g),
noting that London Dumping Convention, supra n. 108, Art. 4, requires prior approval.
120. 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, para. 210.11(g) & n.14, citing inter alia International Law Commission, Report on
the lf70rk oflIS Thirty-First Session: Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Art. 32, U.N. Doc. N34/194 (1979), reprinted in
18 I.L.M. 1557, 1568, 1576 (1979), stating that these are not defenses if the offending country contributes to the
occurrence of the situation of material responsibility. See also Commentary to Draft Articles on State Responsibility
in International Law Commission, Report on the Work ofIts Thirty-First Session, U.N. Doc. N34/10 & Corr. 1 (1979),
reprinted in 2(2) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 122-36 (1979). The practical experience is that jettisoned fuel dissipates quickly
in the atmosphere and does not present an emergency. 4NoRDQUlST,supra, para. 210.11(g)&n.14.Restatement(Third),
supra n. 30, sec. 603, cmt. g & r.n.8 discuss aircraft noxious and noise emissions.
121.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Arts. 18(2}, 39(lXc);see also Territorial Sea Convention,supra n. 31, Art.
14(3); CoLOMBos,supra n. 20, § 181 (customary law); 2 O'CoNNELL, supra n.19, at 853-858 (same). As NWP 9A,supra
n. 30, paras. 1.4.1,2.3.1, 3.2, 3.2.2, 7.3.2, 7.3.7, demonstrate, this customary law of the sea nortO follows different
principles during artOed conflict. See also Hague Convention (VI) Relating to Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at
Outbreak of Hostilities, Oct. 18, 1907, Art. 2, 205 Consol. T.S. 305, 312 [hereinafter Hague VI]; Hague Convention
(Xlm Concerning Rights & Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, Art. 21, 36 Stat. 2415, 2431
[hereinafter Hague XIII]; Convention on Maritime Neutrality, Feb. 28,1928, Art. 17,47, id. 1989,1993,135 L.N.T.S.
187,204; Nyon Arrangement, Sept. 14,1937,Art. 5,181 L.N.T.S. 135, 139; Stockholm Declaration Regarding Similar
Rules ofNeutrality,May27,1938,Arts.4, 7,188id. 294,299,301,305,307,311,313,319,321,325,327; Oxford Manual,
supra n. 30, Arts. 31, 34, 37, reprinted in LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra n. 30, at 290, 292-93; San Remo Manual, supra
n. 30, paras. 21 (Hague XIII rule); 136, Commentary 136.2 (Hague VI considered to be in disuetude); Commentary
168.6 (Hague XIII rule); de Guttry, Commentary, in LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra at 102, 109 (Hague VI oflimited
usefulness); Schindler, Commentary, in id. o supra, at 211, 221 (Hague XIII restates custom, with minor exceptions).
This is yet another example of the "other rules" principle in operation. See supra nn. 64-88 and accompanying text.
122. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 207(3) (land-based pollution), 207(4) (seabed activities subject to
national jurisdiction); see also U.N. Charter, Art. 52.
123. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 207(4}, 208(5), 209(1), 210(4}, 211(1), 212(3).
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124. /d., Arts. 211(3)-211(4); see also Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 604(3). The Convention's negotiating
history demonstrates that under it coastal States cannot require warships to give notice or get prior consent before
entering the territorial sea on innocent passage. See generally RohCH & SMlTII, EXCESSIVE M!.RmME ClAIMS (Nav. War
C. Int'l L. Stud., v. 66, 1994) at 154-60; 1 BROWN, supra n. 33, at 64-72. For principles governing innocent passage,
which apply equally to merchantmen and warships, except that submarines must navigate on the surface and show
their flag, see generally 1982 LOS Convention, supra, Arts. 17-26,45, 52(2). The Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 33
U.S.C. secs. 1221-36 (1994), is a typical national statute regulating enforcement ofsafety and environmental measures
in the territorial sea. A worldwide pattern of these kinds oflaws can evidence customary standards. BROWNUE, supra
n.30,at5.
125. These rules cannot apply to foreign ship design, construction, manning or equipment unless they effectuate
generally accepted international rules or standards. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 19(2Xh), 21; see also 2
NORDQUIST, supra n. 51, paras. 19.1-19.11, 21.1-21.12, noting some States' continued opposition to warships' right of
innocent passage and linkage between 1982 LOS Convention, Arts. 21(1Xf), and 192, supra. The Art. 19(2) list is
exclusive, although ill., An. 19(2)(1), ("any other activity not having a direct bearing on practice") couId be read
expansively. See 2 NORDQUIST, supra, para. 19.11, citing Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International Law
Governing Innocent Passage, Sept. 23, 1989, USSR-U.S., Art. 3, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1444, 1446 (1989) [hereinafter
Uniform Interpretation], noting Russia has accepted this statement; NWP 9A, supra n. 30, para. 2.3.2.1. Aside from
a special rule for ftshing craft, Territorial Sea Convention, supra n. 31, Arts. 4-5, uses a general reasonableness rule to
define innocent passage. See also Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 513 & cmts. a-e, hoi, & r.n.I-2, 6. For analysis
of "other rules of international law" clauses, see supra nn. 64-88 and accompanying text.
126. These ships must carry special documentation too. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 22(2), 23; see also
4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, paras. 22.1-22.9, 23.1-23.9, noting link with 1982 LOS Convention, supra, Arts. 24(I)(b),
25(3),227; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 513(2)(b) & cmt. d. Uniform Interpretation,supra n. 125, Arts. 5,20,
clarifies the Russian text of the 1982 LOS Convention, supra, Art. 22, saying that coastal States may designate sea
lanes and traffic separation schemes "where necessary to protect the safety of navigation." 2 NORDQUIST, supra n. 51,
para. 22.9.
127.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Art. 24; see also 2 NORDQUlST,supra n. 51,paras. 24.1-24.8, noting parallel
language ("form or fact") in 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 25(3),42(2), 52(2), 227; Restatement (Third),
supra n. 30, sec. 513(2) & emt. c; Clingan,Freedom a/Navigation in a Post-UNCLOS III Environment, in Symposium,
supra n. 96 at 107, 111.
128. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 25; see also 2 NORDQUIST, supra n. 51,paras. 25.1-25.9, noting that
Uniform Interpretation, supra n. 125, applies to Art. 25, taken directly from Territorial Sea Convention, supra n. 31,
Arts. 16(1)-16(3); Restatement (Third),supra n. 30, sec. 513(2Xa) & cmt. c, which say there should beno discrimination
among different countries' vessels during temporary suspension; it should apply to ships of all flags.
129.2 NORDQUlST,supra n. 51, para. 25.1, citing Territorial Sea Convention,supra n. 31, Art. 16(3).
130. See generally 2 NORDQUIST, supra n. 51, paras. 25.1-25.9; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, secs. 513, cmt. c;
601-04 state nothing to the contrary.
131. U.N. Charter, An. 51; see also supra n. 72 and accompanying text.
132. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 27-18; see also Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sees. 457, r.n.7;
461, emt. e; 513(2)(b) & cmt. C, e, h, & r.n. 2.
133. 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Art. 2(3); see also Territorial Sea Convention,supra n. 31, Art. 1(2); supra
nn. 64-88 and accompanying text.
134. In the case of archipelagic sea lanes, passage is subject to the right of an archipelagic State, as defined in the
Convention, to designate sea lanes and air routes through its archipelagic waters and adjacent territorial sea. 1982
LOS Convention,supra n. 39,Arts. 45-46, 52-53; compareid., Art. 25(3). Head Harbor Passage through Canadian waters
to Passamaquoddy Bay, offMaine, is an example ofthis kind ofstrait. RoACH & SMITH,supra n.124, at 181; Alexander,
International Straits, in LAW OF NAVAL OPERhTIONS, supra n. 30, at 91, 99. Innocent passage rules also apply to straits
between an island of a State and that State's mainland, if a route exists seaward of the island through the high seas or
an EEZ that is of similar convenience with navigational and hydrographic characteristics. 1982 LOS Convention,
supra, Art. 38(1). The Straits ofMessina, off Italy, is an example. RoACH & SMlTII,SUpra at 181; Alexander, Intemational
Straits, in LAW OF NhVAL OPERhTIONS, surpa n. 30, at l00-{)1. Few countries qualify as archipelagic States under the
Convention. SeegeneraUyill. at 131-32, citing 1982 LOS Convention,supra, Arts. 4647,49, 52-53; see also 2 NORDQUIST,
supra n. 51, paras. 46.1-46.6(f), 47.147.9(m), 49.149.9(d), 52.1-52.7, 53.1-53.9(n). Similar construction should be given
1982 LOS Convention, supra, An. 52(2), and its authority to temporarily suspend innocent passage through
archipelagic waters. As for territorial sea innocent passage, which has broader application potential, see also supra n.
125-31 and accompanying text.
135.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Art. 53; see also 2 NORDQUlST,supra n. 51,paras. 53.1-53.9(n); Restatement
(Third), supra n. 30, sec. 513(4) & emt. k, r.n.4.
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136. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 38(1), 45(1)(b), 52-54; id., Art. 54 incorporates by reference id., Arts.
39-40,42,44; see also 2 NORDQUIST, supra n. 51, paras. 54.1-54.7(b) and supra nn. 125-31 and accompanying text. Most
commentators agree that Convention rules on nonsuspendable straits passage reflect eustom. See generally, Clingan,
supra n. 127, at 117; Harlow, Comment, in Symposium, supra n. 96, at 125, 128; Oxman, Regime oj Warships, supra n.
67, at 851-61; Schachte, Intemational Straits and Navigational Freedoms, 24 Ocean Deve!. & Int'l L. 179, 181-84 (1993).
137. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 233, incorporating by reference id., Arts. 42(IXa)-(b), 236, would
appear to apply, strictly speaking, to straits transit passage regimes because ofreferences to Art. 42; the straits innocent
passage regime, and provisions governing territorial sea innocent passage have no similar intervention provisions,
although such might be inferred from coastal State authority to enact environmental laws that might include authority
to intervene. Warships, naval auxiliaries, etc., have sovereign immunity as in the case of transit passage. See generally
id., Arts. 17-32,45,236; S. Doc. 103-39, reprinted in 6 U.S. Dep't St. Dispatch Supp. No.1, at 11-15, 23, saying that by
extension these principles apply to archipelagic sea lanes passage and straits passage. The U.S. Navy has taken the
position that a straits passage regime also applies to approaches to straits. The Navy position that warships, operating
in normal mode (i.e. submarines traversing these straits submerged), may employ formation steaming and conduct
air operations as incidental to normal navigation practices, so long as there is no threat to the coastal State(s), is
consistent with the transit passage regime. Alexander, supra n. 134 in LAw OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra n. 30, at 92;
Clove, Submarine Navigation in International StrailS: A Legal Perspectiu, 39 Nav. L. Rev. 103, 105 (1990); Schachte,
Intemational Straits, supra n. 136, at 184-86, but see Lowe, Commander's Handbook, supra n. 67, in LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, supra on naval operations in transit straits. If this is accepted as practice, the environmental protection
regime appurtenant to straits passage applies to this area too. The issue of straits passage for belligerents illustrates
the interface of the LOS and the LOAC preserved by the "other rules" clauses of the law of the sea. See generally NWP
9A,supra n. 30, paras. 2.3.3-2.3.3.2,2.5.1.1; San Remo Manual, supra n. 30, paras. 23-33; Mayama, The Influence oJthe
Straits Transit Regime on the Law oj Neutrality at Sea, 26 Ocean Devel. & Int'l L. 1 (1995); supra nn. 64-88 and
accompanying text.
138.1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 31; compare Territorial Sea Convention, supra n. 31, Art. 24, which
inter alia provides for a 12-mile zone. The contiguous zone's outer limit means that States asserting a territorial sea
less than the full extent provided by the 1982 Convention, 12 miles, or under customary law for States party to the
1958 Conventions, may declare a contiguous zone up to the limits permitted by whichever convention is in force for
them. See also Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 51I(b) & emt. Ie.
139. See generally 2 NORDQUIST, supra n. 51, paras. 33.1-33.8(i).
140.1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 303(1)-303(2) provides:
1. States have the duty to protect objects of an archeological and historical nature found at sea and shall
co-operate for this purpose.
2•••• rrlo control traffic in such objects, the coastal State may, in applying Article 33, presume that their
removal in the contiguous zone ••• without its approval would result in an infringement within its territory
or territorial sea of the laws and regulations referred to in that article.
141. See generally 5 NORDQUIST, supra n. 47, paras. 303.1-303.10.
142. Art. 303 also does not affect identifiable owners' rights, salvage law or other admiralty rules, or culrural
exchange laws and practices. 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Arts. 303(3)-03(4). Under traditional admiralty law,
shipwrecks and objects found at sea are a rmder's property, unless its national law or the law of the salvor provides
otherwise. See generally Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 521, r.n.6; SCllOENBAUM, supra n. 22, ch. 14; S. Doc.
103-39, supra n. 40, 6 U.S. Dep't St. Dispatch, Supp. No.1, at 51, citing U.S. legislation that may alter these rules.
Title to warships or government aircraft is never lost until a flag State officially abandons or relinquishes it. If an
aircraft or ship is caprured, title vests then in the captor State. NWP 9A,supra n. 30, paras. 2.1.2.2-2.1.2.3, 8.2.1; see
also Agreement Concerning Wreck of C.S.S. Alabama, Oct. 3, 1989, Fr.-U.S., T.I.A.S. No. 11687_
143. See supra nn. 64-88 and accompanying text.
144.5 NORDQUIST, supra n. 47, para. 303.10.
145.1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 149.
146. Id. supra n. 39, Arts. 55, 56(IXa), 56(IXbXiii)-56(c), 57-58, defining the EEZ as extending outward 200
nautical miles from territorial sea baselines and providing that coastal States have "sovereign rights for •. " conserving
and managing their natural resources, ••• living or non-living, of the waters subjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed
and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone,
[e.g.] • •• production of energy from the water, currents and winds; [and] ••• jurisdiction as provided for in •.• this
Convention [for] ••• protection and preservation of the marine environment; [and] other rights and duties provided
for in this Convention." See also id., Art. 60, giving the coastal State exclusive rights and jurisdiction over artificial
islands and other EEZ installations. ld., Arts. 61-72, expand upon standards for conservation and use of living
resources, stocks occurring within two or more countries' EEZs, various kinds of sea life, and rights oflandlocked
and geographically disadvantaged States.ld., Art. 73, declares standards for enforcing coastal State EEZ laws. See also
2 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, paras. 55.1-55.1I(d), 56.1-56.11(e), 57.1-57.8(b), 58.1-58.10(f), 60.1-60.15(m), 61.1-61.12(k),
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62.1-62.16(1}, 63.1-63.12(f), 64.1-64.9(f), 65.1-65.16(i), 66.1-66.9(g), 67.1-67.8(e), 68.1-68.5(b), 69.1-69.17(h),
70.1-70.11(d), 71.1-71.9(c), 71.1-71.10(b), 73.1-73.10(b); S. Doc. 103-39,6 U.S. Dep't St. Dispatch Supp. No.l,at2S-27.
As of 1992,86 States had EEZs; 20 more claimed fishing zones. The EEZ "is now widely considered to be a part of
general international law." 2 NORDQUIST, supra, para. V.33; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 514, cmt. a. While
id. sec. 514(1) generally follows Convention criteria as to EEZ sovereignty and jurisdiction, Source NOle says "authority"
is used instead of "jurisdiction" because of the Restatement's different characterization of jurisdiction in other
contexts; 1982 LOS Convention, supra, Arts. SS, 58, specifically referring to id., Arts. 87-115, which declare inler alia
high seas freedoms of navigation which apply to the EEZ. States therefore cannot exclude warships on environmental
grounds from their EEZ.
147. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 211(5). A special qualification to this general rule is id., Art. 234,
providing that coastal States may adopt and enforce nondiscriminatory laws for preventing, reducing and controlling
pollution from ships in ice-covered areas to the limits of their EEZs where particularly severe climatic conditions and
ice create obstructions or exceptional navigational hazards, "and pollution of the marine environment could cause
major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance." Such laws must have "due regard to navigation
and the protection and preservation of the marine environment. •.." Territorial, and hence territorial sea, claims arc
frozen as to Antarctica by the Antarctic Treaty, supra n. 68, Art. 4. For now, and unless there is a new Ice Age, Art.
234 only applies to Arctic Sea rim States, e.g., the United States. S. Doc. 102-39,6 U.S. Dep't St. Dispatch Supp. No.
1, at 24, noting that key States concerned, i.e. Canada, the USSR and the United States, negotiated Art. 234 to provide
the basis for implementing provisions for commercial and private vessels in the 1970 Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution
Prevention Act consistent with Art. 234 and other relevant Convention provisions while protecting "fundamental
U.S. security interests" in exercising navigational rights and freedoms throughout the Arctic. See also 2 O'CoNNELL,
supra n. 19, at 1022-2S.
148. See supra nn. 96, 100, 119 and accompanyiog text for EEZ analysis. See also 1982 LOS Convention, supra n.
39, Arts. 76-78, 80, declaring that the shelf can extend outward the same distance, 200 nautical miles, as the EEl,
along the ocean bottom, or to the edge of the continental margin, whichever is greater, but not over 350 miles; 2
NORDQUIST, supra n. 51, paras. 76.1-76.18(m), 77.1-77.7(d), 78.1-78.8(d), 80.1-80.9, noting adaptation of Continental
Shelf Convention, supra n. 31, Arts. 2-5; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 515.
149. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 55, 56{I)(bXiii), 56(2), 58(3), 60(3), 60(7), 78-80, also employing a
"must not infringe - unjustifiable interference" formula for shelf and high seas rights interfaces and a "reasonable
exploration" - "may not impede" rule for interface of shelf and submarine cable and pipeline rights. See also 2
NORDQUIST, supra n. 51, paras. 56.11(e)-56.11(f), S8.1O-S8.1O(f), 60.1S(f), 60.1S(j), 66.9(d), 78.S(c), 79.8(e), 80.9;
Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sees. 514, cmt. e; 515(2). "Due regard" or similar phrases also appear in other
provisions of the 1982 LOS Convention,supra, Art. 87(2), (due regard for others' high seas rights and freedoms, and
for Area activities), and in Continental Shelf Convention, supra n. 31, Arts. 4-5, ("reasonable measures ••• , may not
impede"; no "unjustifiable interference with navigation, fIShing," etc.); High Seas Convention, supra n. 31, Arts. 2,
26(2) ("reasonable regard" for others' high seas freedoms); Territorial Sea Convention,supra n. 31,Art. 19(4) (balancing
navigation interests with right of arrest for crimes committed in the territorial sea).
150.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Arts. 58(1)-58(2),78, referring to id., Arts. 86-115; see also supra nn. 64-88
and accompanying text for "other rules" analysis.
151. 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, para. 211.15(b).
152. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 213-14, 216, 222; see also 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, paras.
213.1-213.7(f), 214.l-214.7(c), 216.l-216.7(d), 222.1-222.8.
153. Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 603; see also supra n. 97 and accompanying text.
154. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 217-20, 223-24, 226-31, expanding on rules in the navigational
articles, id., Arts. 21(IXf), 28(2), 56(1)(bXiii), 56(3), 60(1), SO; see also 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, paras. 217.1-217.8G),
218.1-21S(9Xh), 219.1-219.8(d), 220.1-220.11(n), 223.1-223.9(c), 224.1-224.7(e), 226.1-226.11(e), 227.1-227.7,
228.1-228.11(h),229.1-229.5,230.1-230.9(c),231.1-231.9(c);Restatement(Third),supra n. 30,sees. 457, r.n.7; 461, cmt.
e;512.
155.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Art. 22S;see also 4 NORDQUlST,supra n. 20, paras. 225.1-225.9; Restatement
(Third), supra n. 30, sec. 513, cmt. e.
156. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 232, 235; see also 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, paras. 232.1-232.6{c),
235.1-235.10(g); Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 604, r.n.3. Article 235 was derived from the Stockholm
Declaration, supra n. 52, Principle 56; 4 NORDQUIST, supra, para. 235.1.
157. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 221; Charney, supra n. 47, at 892 n.79; see also 4 NORDQUIST, supra n.
20, paras. 221.1-221.9(h); Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 603, r.n. 3, noting similar provisions in 1969
Intervention Convention,supra n. 22,Art.l, and 1973 Intervention Protocol,supra n. 22, to which numerous countries
are parry. TIF, supra n. 32, at 385; Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and the
Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, U.N.G.A. Res. 2749 (1970), para. 13(b), reprinted in 10
I.L.M. 220, 223 (1971).
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158. Cf. BIRNlB & BoyLE, supra n. 28, at 286; BROWNLIE, supra n. 30, at 5; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec.
102(3), cmts. f, i, r.n.5.
159. See supra nn. 4-6 and accompanying text.
160. See supra nn. 64-88 and accompanying text.
161. See supra nn. 10-11, 13-16 and accompanying text.
162. Compare 1982 LOS Convention, supra n_ 39, Art. 236, with id., Arts. 42(5), 96, 110(1); see also High Seas
Convention,supra n. 31,Arts. 8(1); 3 NORDQUlST,supra n. 67,paras. 95.1-96.6(c); 4id,supra n. 20, paras. 236.1-236.6(f).
Warship and naval auxiliary immunity is an accepted rule ofinternational law. 3 id., para. 95.1; 4 id., para. 236.1.
163. S. Doc. 103-39,supra n. 40, 6 U.S. Dep't St. Dispatch Supp. No.1, at 24.
IM.E.g., Convention on Protection of the Environment, Feb. 19, 1974, Arts. 1,13,1092 U.N.T.S. 280, 296, 298,
among Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.
165. Kuwait Regional Convention, supra n. 53, Art. 14; Red Sea Convention, supra n. 54, Art. 14.
166. See supra nn. 46-49 and accompanying text. Other regional treaties say they are subject to present and future
LOS conventions, e.g., Convention for Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Feb. 16, 1976, Art.
3(1),1102 U.N.T.S. 27,46, and its protocols.
167. See supra nn. 31,40, 162 and accompanying text.
168. Compare 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 94(4Xc), with High Seas Convention,supra n. 31, Art. 10.
169. Compare 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Art. 94(7), with High Seas Convention,supra n. 31, Art. 11(1);
see also 3 NORDQUlST,supra n. 67, para. 94.8(k).
170. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 122-23; 3 NORDQUIST, supra n. 67, at 344; see also id, para. 123.12(e),
listing inter alia Kuwait Regional Convention and Red Sea Regional Convention, supra nn. 53-54 as among regional
coordination agreements for semi·enclosed areas.
171. Compare1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Art. 87(1), with High Seas Convention,supra n. 31, Art. 2; see also
supra n. 67 and accompanying text.
172. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 24O(d). Indeed, id., Art. 87(lXf), declares that the right to conduct
scientific research is subject to rules in Parts VI and XIII of the Convention. Pan VI declares rules for the continental
shelf, and Part XIII states general principles for protecting marine environment. See supra nn. 9, 92·123, 148-50 and
accompanying text. Subject to other Convention provisions, States conducting research must give other countries
reasonable opportunity to obtain information necessary to prevent and control damage to the health and safety of
persons and to the marine environment. 1982 LOS Convention,supra, Art. 242. A research installation or equipment
is subject to the same rules prescribed for conducting research. Id., Art. 258. See also 2 O'CoNNEt.L, supra n. 19, ch.26.
Vessels collecting scientific data are protected from capture under the law of naval warfare during armed conflict; if
they are engaged in data collection for likely military application, they are not so protected. San Remo Manual, supra
n. 30, paras. 47(f), 136(e).
173. Compare 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Arts. 87(IXe), 116,with High Seas Convention, supra n. 31, Art.
2; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 521(2Xc).
174. S. Doc.l03·39,supra n. 40,6 U.S. Dep't St. Dispatch, Supp. No.1, at 27.
175. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 116, incorporating id., Arts. 63(2), 64-67,118-20; compare Fishery
Convention,supra n. 31, Arts. 1-8, 13; see also Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 521, cmt. e; S. Doc. 103-39, supra
n. 40, 6 U.S. Dep't St. Dispatch, Supp. No.1, at 27-28, listing treaties regulating or prohibiting high seas fIShing. 1982
LOS Convention,supra, ArtS. 56,61-73, regulate EEZ fIShing. See also 3 NORDQUIST supra n. 67, paras. 116.1-116.9(g);
Charney, supra n. 47, at 896·901.
176.1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39,Art. 87; compare High Seas Convention,supra n. 31, Art. 2, declaring that
a State exercising a high seas freedom through its vessels or aircraft must have "reasonable regard" for others'
concurrrent exercises of those freedoms.
177. With regard to fIShing, this statement is onlyttuewith respect to the high seas where no littoral State interests,
e.g. those in an EEZ, apply. In the latter case, high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight and other non·resource
activities are preserved by the 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39.
178.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39,Art. 87(2).
179. Id., Art.1(IXl);see 2 NORDQUlST,supra n. 51, paras. 1.1-1.19, 1.26·1.31; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec.
523, cmt. b, declaring that id., sec. 523(IXa) recites a customary principle, that "[N]o State may claim or exercise
sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights over any pan of the sea-bed and subsoil beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction, or over its mineral resources, and no State or person may appropriate any part of that area ••• " Id., sec.
523(IXb) recites the U.S. view of the law:
••• unless prohibited by international agreement, a state may engage, or authorize any[one] to engage,
in ••• exploration for and exploitation of that area, provided that such activities are conducted (i) without
claiming or exercising sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights in any pan of that area, and (ii) with
reasonable regard for the right of other states or persons to engage in similar activities and to exercise the
freedoms of the high seas; ••• minerals [so] extracted ••• become the property of the mining State or person.

220

Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict

Id., cmL b.
180. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 136. 140(1). The "common heritage" concept began with the
Antarctic Treaty, supra n. 68, and continued with conventions related to outer space. Restatement (Third), supra n.
30, sec. 523, cmL b & r.n.2 adopted the then U.S. position that deep seabed mining was a high seas freedom, rejecting
the "common heritage" view in the Convention. However, if the Convention is accepted generally, "without dissent
by .•• important ••. States, the sea-bed mining regime .• _may become effective also as custom ••••" !d., sec. 523,
cmLe.
181. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 135; see also Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, secs. 521, cmt. i; 523.
182.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, ArL 137(2). Id., Arts. 156-91, are constitutive provisions for the Authority;
they would be modified by the Boat Agreement,supra n. 40, to amend Part XI of the Convention. See S. Doc. 103-39,
supra n. 40, 6 U.S. Dep't SL Dispatch Supp. No.1, at 34-43.
183.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39,Arts.14546.
184. Id., ArL 149; see also supra nn. 65-78 and accompanying text for the relationship between this provision and
the contiguous zone and the "other rules of intemationallaw" clauses found elsewhere in the Convention.
185. Compare 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 147(1), 147(2Xb), 147(c), with id., Arts. 60, 80; see also
Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 523(lXbXii) & cmL d, stating a more solicitous view of high seas freedoms.
186.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, ArL 138, referring to id., Arts. 133-91.
187. Compare id., Art. 141,21, with id., Arts. 88,24O(a).
188. See supra nn. 64-88 and accompanying texL
189. MAHMOUDI, THE LAw OF DEEP SEA-BED MINING (1987) at 173-75.
190. The treaties disclaim any intention to affect parties' rights or claims as to their maritime jurisdiction
"established in conformity with intemationallaw." Kuwait Regional Convention, supra n. 53, Arts. 2, IS; Red Sea
Convention, supra n. 54, Arts. 2, 15. The protocols allow application to ports, harbors, estuaries, bays and lagoons if
there is a "marine emergency," and if the particular country so decides. "Marine emergency" is defined broadly.
Kuwait Protocol, supra n. 53, Arts. 1(2), 4. Red Sea Protocol, supra n. 54, Arts. 1(2),4. These treaties implement
environmental policies of 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 122-23; see also supra n. 170 and accompanying
text.
191. Compare Kuwait Regional Convention, supra n. 53, Art. 1(a), with Red Sea Convention, supra n. 54, ArL 1(2).
192. Kuwait Regional Convention, supra n. 53, Arts. 3(a), 4-7; Red Sea Convention, supra n. 54, Arts. 3(1), 4-8,
which adds a pledge to prevent, abate and combat pollution "resulting from other human activities."
193. See generally Kuwait Protocol, supra n. 53; Red Sea Protocol, supra n. 54.
194. Compare Kuwait ProtocoI,supra n. 53, Art. 1(2), with Red Sea Protocol,supra n. 54, Art. 1(2).
195. See supra nn. 157-59 and accompanying texL
196. The Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Centre, an administrative agency, also must be notified. Kuwait Protocol,
supra n. 53, Arts. 3, 10; Red Sea Protocol,supra n. 54, Arts. 3, 7(2).
197. Kuwait Protocol,supra n. 53, ArL 1(4); Red Sea Protocol,supra n. 54, Art. 1(4).
198. See supra nn. 157-59 and accompanying text.
199. See also supra n. 72 and accompanying texL
200. See supra nn. 52-54 and accompanying texL
201. Neither Iran nor Iraq was party to the 1958 LOS Conventions,supra n. 31. The customary principle of "other
rules ofintemationallaw," restated in these agreements and the 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, did apply, however.
See supra nn. 64-88 and accompanying text.
202. See supra nn. 80-83 and accompanying texL
203. See supra nn. 191-94 and accompanying text.
204. See supra n. 60 and accompanying texL
205. Okorodudu-Fubara, supra n. 2, at 197; see also supra nn. 58-61 and accompanying texL
206. See supra nn. 4-6 and accompanying texL
207. Kuwait Protocol, supra n. 53, arL 1(2).
208See supra n. 4 and accompanying texL
209. See supra nn. 8-9, 18 and accompanying texL
210. The U.N. Security Council deplored attacks on merchant shipping. If these Resolutions had been obeyed,
they would have resulted in no more attacks on these vessels and therefore no more pollution of the Gulffrom this
cause. These resolutions covered a specific point, i.e. freedom of navigation, and therefore should not be construed as
applying special Charter law to the exclusion of conventional norms, to these situations. See supra n. 8 and
accompanying texL
211. See supra nn. 80·83 and accompanying texL
212. See supra nn. 8, 46 and accompanying texL
213. See supra n. 62 and accompanying text.
214. See supra nn. 10-11,13-16 and accompanying text; see also Okorodudu-Fubara, supra n. 2, at 196.
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215. See supra n. 55 and accompanying text.
216. See supra n. 54 and accompanying text.
217. See supra nn. 103,142, 149, 176, 185 and accompanying text.
218.See supra nn. 132,137,150,162-167 and accompanying text.
219. See supra nn. 64-88, 121, 133, 142-43, 160, 186-89, 201 and accompanying text.
220. See supra nn. 68-72, 186-89 and accompanying text.
221. See supra nn. 157-59, 195-99 and accompanying text.
222. See supra nn. 4-6 and accompanying text.
223. See supra nn. 190-216 and accompanying text.
224. See supra n. 46 and accompanying text.
225. See supra nn. 190-216 and accompanying text.
226. See supra nn. 55,215-16 and accompanying text.
227. See supra nn. 46-49 and accompanying text.
228. Compare LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Part II.c.1 with Part II.c.2.
229. See mpra nn. 46-49 and accompanying text.
230. See supra nn. 60, 62-63,131 and accompanying text.
231.See mpra nn. 132, 137, 150, 162-67,218 and accompanying text.
232. See mpra nn. 64-88, 121,133,142-42,160,186-89,201,219-20 and accompanying text.
233. See supra nn. 103,142, 149, 176-78, 185,217,228 and accompanying text.
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